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THE EUROPEAN JURISPRUDENCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS
J.A. ANDREWS*
I. INTRODUCTION
Americans have long been familiar with a system of law in which
certain individual rights are protected by a written constitution, and in
which that constitution is paramount to any legislative or executive acts.
In sharp contrast to the United States, however, the country whose legal
system otherwise has had the greatest influence on American law lacks
any equivalent written constitution. There are no fundamental rights in
the United Kingdom beyond those established by decisions of the courts
and Acts of Parliament. Even the Magna Carta can be and has been
overridden by new legislation. Of course, human rights have been com-
monly recognised and protected within the United Kingdom, but this
merely reflects the good sense of successive governments and generations
of people. The fact remains that there has been no supra-legislative pro-
tection for the basic rights of United Kingdom citizens.
This situation now is changing, and the changes reflect the growing
Europeanisation of the government and affairs of the United Kingdom.
In the area of human rights we are not concerned with the European
Economic Community, more frequently called the Common Market,
but rather with an older and larger organisation known as the Council
of Europe. This Article will review the origins and structure of the sys-
tem for protection of human rights established by the Council of Eu-
rope, and then go on to examine the case law under that system and its
impact on member states.
Throughout this discussion the primary but not exclusive emphasis
will be on how the government and people of the United Kingdom have
been affected by the protection of human rights under the auspices of
the Council of Europe. This emphasis on the United Kingdom reflects
the author's background and experience, but it is hoped that it also will
serve to provide a kind of case study of some of the problems that can
arise whenever individual rights and the conflicting needs of societies
must be reconciled.
* Professor of Law in the University of Wales and Head of the Department of Law,
University College of Wales, Aberystwyth.
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II. THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
Immediately following the Second World War there was a surge of
interest among Europeans in the creation of a more unified Europe.
The Movement for European Unity, as it has been called, was
spearheaded by influential statesmen such as Sir Winston Churchill and
supported by national and international organisations and political
groups.' A number of those organisations joined together to organise a
"Congress of Europe" at the Hague, in Brussels, in May of 1948.2 The
delegates to the Congress adopted a "Message to Europeans," which
proclaimed in part that "[w]e desire a Charter of Human Rights guar-
anteeing liberty of thought, assembly and expression. . .; [and w]e de-
sire a Court of Justice with adequate sanctions for the implementation
of this Charter . . . ." A proposal made during the Hague Congress
further urged that "[g]overnments should as a condition of membership
of the [proposed European] Council subscribe to a common Declaration
guaranteeing the fundamental personal and civic rights essential for the
maintenance of democracy and should recognise the authority of the
Council to enforce them."4
A year after the Hague Congress ended the Council of Europe was
born. The Council came into being on May 5, 1949, when the foreign
ministers of its ten original member states signed the organisation's char-
ter or Statute.5 According to its Statute, the Council was formed to
pursue the aim of "greater unity between its Members" through, inter
alia, "agreements and common action. . . in the maintenance and fur-
l. Churchill led the United Europe Movement in Britain. Other groups included the
Economic League for European Co-operation, the French Council for United Europe, the
European Union of Federalists, and the Socialist Movement for the United States of Europe.
MANUAL OF THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE 3-4 (1970) [hereinafter cited as MANUAL]. On the
Movement for European Unity, see generally A. ROBERTSON, EUROPEAN INSTITUTIONS, CO-
OPERATION: INTEGRATION: UNIFICATION (3d ed. 1973).
The unifying accomplishment of the immediate postwar years included the creation
of the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation in 1948 and the signing of the
North Atlantic [Defence] Treaty in 1949. Two other accomplishments, the creation of the
Council of Europe in 1949 and the signing of the European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in 1950, are discussed in the text. See infra notes
5-16 and accompanying text.
2. MANUAL, supra note 1, at 4.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 261.
5. Id. at 6-7. The Statute of the Council of Europe is reprinted in id. at 299 app. I
[hereinafter cited as Statute]. The 10 original signatories to the Statute were Belgium, Den-
mark, France, the Irish Republic, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and
the United Kingdom (consisting of England, Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland). The
Council now has 21 members, including Austria, Cyprus, the Federal Republic of Germany,
Greece, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Malta, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, and Turkey in addition
to the original 10 members.
[VOL. 43:463
EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS
ther realisation of human rights and fundamental freedoms." 6 The
Council's Consultative Assembly made protection of human rights the
subject of one of its early general debates, and appointed a committee to
look into how member states might collectively guarantee such rights.7
Just over a year after that early debate, on November 4, 1950, the Euro-
pean Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms (the Convention)' was signed-the first convention concluded
under the auspices of the Council of Europe.
The Convention recognises certain basic rights and freedoms as
"the foundation of justice and peace in the world,"9 which the states
party to it (the High Contracting Parties) "shall secure to everyone
within their jurisdiction."'" It provides that everyone whose rights
under the Convention have been violated "shall have an effective rem-
edy before a national authority,"'" and that the rights and freedoms it
6. Statute, id. art. l(a)-(b).
7. MANUAL, supra note 1, at 261 (debate on Aug. 19, 1949).
8. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953), reprinted in R. LIL-
LICH, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS 500.1 app. (1983) [hereinafter cited as
Eur. Cony. on Human Rights]. The Convention entered into force when it had been ratified
by 10 member states. MANUAL, supra note 1, at 263. It has now been ratified by all 21
current member states. COUNCIL OF EUROPE, REPORT ON THE [A]CTIVITIES OF THE COUN-
CIL OF EUROPE 24 (1982).
A number of books have been written on the European Convention on Human
Rights but, because of its rapidly developing case law, some of them are becoming increas-
ingly dated. They include R. BEDDARD, HUMAN RIGHTS AND EUROPE (2d ed. 1980); F.
CASTBERG, THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (1974); A. DRZEMCZEWSKI,
EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS CONVENTION IN DOMESTIC LAW (1983); J. FAWCETr, THE AP-
PLICATION OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (1969); F. JACOBS, THE
EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (1975); Z. NEDJATI, HUMAN RIGHTS UNDER
THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION (European Studies in Law Vol. 8, 1978). The Drzemczewski
book itself contains a very good bibliography. On the history of the Convention, see A. ROB-
ERTSON, HUMAN RIGHTS IN EUROPE 1-14 (2d ed. 1977).
9. Eur. Conv. on Human Rights, supra note 8, preamble.
10. Id. art. 1. The rights and freedoms secured by the Convention include: the right to
life (art. 2) (see ingfa notes 214-29 and accompanying text); freedom from torture and inhuman
or degrading treatment (art. 3); freedom from slavery and servitude (art. 4); "the right to
liberty and security of person" (art. 5); certain procedural rights "in the determination of...
civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge" (art. 6); freedom from being prosecuted
successfully under ex post facto criminal laws (art. 7); "the right to respect for . . .private
and family life,. . home and. . . correspondence" (art. 8); "freedom of thought, conscience
and religion" (art. 9); "freedom of expression" (art. 10); "freedom of peaceful assembly" and
association (art. 11); and "the right to marry and . . .found a family" (art. 12). Additional
rights and freedoms are protected by several protocols to the Convention-e.g., rights to
property, education, and free elections. Protocol No. 1, Mar. 20, 1952, 213 U.N.T.S. 262
(entered into force May 18, 1954), reprinted in R. LILLICH, supra note 8, at 510.1 app. (1983)
[hereinafter cited as Protocol No. 1].
11. Eur. Cony. on Human Rights, supra note 8, art. 13.
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guarantees "shall be secured without discrimination on any ground."' 2
The obligations of the states party to the Convention may be derogated
from "[i]n time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of
the nation,"' 3 but the rights guaranteed by the Convention may be re-
stricted only for prescribed purposes."
One aspect of the Convention was entirely unique at the time of its
drafting, and is responsible for the special character of the Convention
as an international agreement protecting human rights: It does not stop
at imposing obligations upon the states party to it, but goes on to pro-
vide a structure by means of which those obligations may be enforced.
"To ensure the observance of the engagements undertaken by the High
Contracting Parties" under the Convention, the European Commission
of Human Rights and the European Court of Human Rights were cre-
ated. 5 Article 25 provides that each state signatory to the Convention,
if it chooses, may recognize the competence of the Commission to re-
ceive petitions from "any person. . . or group of individuals claiming to
be the victim of [that state's] violation" of rights guaranteed by the Con-
vention. Article 46 further provides that the High Contracting Parties
may "recognis[e] as compulsory . . . the jurisdiction of the Court in all
matters concerning the interpretation and application of the ...
Convention."
The enforcement mechanism thus built into the Convention was an
important innovation. Because of it the Convention has been character-
ised as sui generis, a law transcending traditional boundaries between
international and domestic law and establishing "a new legal order."'
' 6
It ought to be noted, however, that the Convention was not entirely
without precedent. In determining what substantive rights should be
guaranteed, those responsible for proposing and drafting the Conven-
tion primarily looked to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was signed on Decem-
ber 10, 1948. " At the time of its proclamation it was said to have "a
moral value and authority . . . without precedent in the history of the
12. Id. art. 14.
13. Id. art. 15. States signatory to the Convention also may limit the territories to which
the protection of the Convention will extend (art. 63), may make a "reservation" at the time
of signing or ratifying the Convention with respect to a particular provision or provisions that
are inconsistent with domestic laws then in force (art. 64), and may withdraw prospectively
from the Convention by means of a "denunciation" (art. 65).
14. Id. art. 18.
15. Id. art. 19; see arts. 20-56.
16. A. DRZEMCZEWSKI, supra note 8, at 22-23.
17. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. Doe. A/810, at
71 (1948), reprinted in R. LILLICH, supra note 8, at 440.1 [hereinafter cited as Universal
Declaration].
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world,""8 and in fact it has been enormously influential.' 9  It was
adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations by a vote of
forty-eight in favour and none against, with eight abstentions. 20 Among
those who abstained was the delegate from the USSR. 21 Behind his ab-
stention lay an old problem: the difficulty of giving human rights a uni-
versally acceptable content. The Soviet Union objected to the Universal
Declaration both because it included a defence of property rights and
because it failed to include protection of the social and economic rights
regarded as fundamental in Marxist ideology.
Unlike the members of the General Assembly in 1948, the founding
members of the Council of Europe had a long common historical associ-
ation and shared cultural, economic, and social values. The members
were able to agree fairly quickly, therefore, as to which human rights
were to be protected by the Convention (and by the first protocol to the
Convention, which followed shortly).22 The issues that for a time di-
vided those who negotiated the Convention's terms revolved instead
around the question of how the rights were to be stated and protected.
Chief among those issues were:
(1) whether the rights to be protected ought to be phrased broadly
or defined in detail;
(2) whether individuals ought to have direct access to process
under the Convention; and
(3) whether there ought to be some form of compulsory jurisdiction
over member states accused of violating their obligations under the
Convention. 3
All three of these issues will be addressed, because the development
of the new European jurisprudence of human rights can be understood
only in light of the compromises reached with respect to each of them.
The question as to whether rights ought to be stated broadly or defined
18. A. ROBERTSON, supra note 8, at 6 n.10 (quoting "a speech [by] the Belgian delegate
upon the adoption of the Declaration . . ").
19. The Universal Declaration was drafted by an international commission headed by
Eleanor Roosevelt, who envisioned it as a kind of Magna Carta for the world. A. ROBERT-
SON, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE WORLD 26-27 (2d ed. 1982). U Thant, former Secretary-Gen-
eral of the UN, is reported to have noted in 1968 that the Universal Declaration had served as
inspiration for more than 40 constitutions and had been quoted or reproduced in legislation
all over the world. Id. at 28. For the history and impact of the Universal Declaration, see id.
at 26-28 and sources cited therein.
20. A. ROBERTSON, supra note 19, at 27.
21. The other abstaining states were the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Czecho-
slovakia, Poland, the Ukranian Soviet Socialist Republic, Yugoslavia, Saudi Arabia, and
South Africa.
22. See MANUAL, supra note 1, at 261-63; see also supra notes 8 & 10.
23. See, e.g., MANUAL, supra note 1, at 262.
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in detail is in some ways the most fundamental of the three, but it will
be addressed last because it is best considered in the light of an under-
standing of how individual access to process and compulsory jurisdiction
over signatory states actually operate within the framework of the
Convention.
A. The Right of Individual Petition and the
European Commission of Human Rights
The most radical innovation incorporated into the Convention was
that individuals were to be allowed to petition the European Commis-
sion of Human Rights. The Convention was the first international in-
strument purporting to guarantee individual rights which also provided
a means of enforcing them. Individuals were to have direct access to
machinery of protection outside their own states, although under the
compromise embodied in article 25, they could make application only
against those signatory states that accepted the right of individual peti-
tion by lodging a separate declaration to that effect. 24
International legal historians probably will look back on the institu-
tion of this right as one of the greatest and most radical legal develop-
ments of the twentieth century.2 5 Even if the Convention is viewed as
regional rather than international in a broader sense, the significance of
the achievement is not diminished. The most startling aspect of the
right of individual petition under article 25 is that by lodging declara-
tions recognising the Commission's competence to receive such petitions,
all but four signatory states have allowed their treatment of their own
citizens to be subjected to review in an international forum as a matter
of right.26 Sweden was the first of the High Contracting Parties to make
this gesture of faith in the "likemindedness" and "common heritage"
24. Article 25 of the Convention provides that:
1. The Commission may receive petitions addressed to the Secretary Gen-
eral of the Council of Europe from any person, non-governmental organization or
group of individuals claiming to be the victim of a violation by one of the High
Contracting Parties of the rights set forth in this Convention, provided that the
High Contracting Party against which the complaint has been lodged has declared
that it recognizes the competence of the Commission to receive such petitions.
Those of the High Contracting Parties who have made such a declaration undertake
not to hinder in any way the effective exercise of this right.
2. Such declarations may be made for a specific period.
Eur. Cony. on Human Rights, supra note 8, art. 25.
25. Professor Morrisson, for example, has characterised the system of enforcing human
rights under the Convention as "one of the few truly new social institutions of the twentieth
century." C. MORRISSON, JR., THE DYNAMICS OF DEVELOPMENT IN THE EUROPEAN
HUMAN RIGHTS CONVENTION SYSTEM v (1981).
26. Only Cyprus, Greece, Malta, and Turkey have not lodged a declaration accepting the
right of individual petition. See A. DRZEMCZEWSKI, supra note 8, at 61.
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posited in the Convention's preamble.2 7 She and the other signatory
states that took that step pioneered a course for others to follow.28
Of course, where there is a right of individual petition there must
be some kind of structure and process for the review of applications re-
ceived. The first level of review within the framework of the Convention
is the European Commission of Human Rights. The Commission con-
sists of a number of members equal to the number of signatory states,
which is twenty-one at present.2 9 Its members generally are experienced
lawyers, elected by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe
from lists of candidates nominated by the High Contracting Parties.3"
The Commission receives both individual applications under arti-
cle 25 and referrals of alleged violations by the High Contracting Parties
themselves under article 24. Any applications submitted under article
25 which fail to meet certain criteria are declared to be "inadmissible"
and are rejected by the Commission. The Commission may not deal
with a petition if all domestic remedies have not been exhausted or if
more than six months have elapsed since the final domestic decision was
27. Sweden deposited its declaration under article 25 on February 4, 1952. COUNCIL OF
EUROPE, EUR. CONV. ON HUMAN RIGHTS: COLLECTED TEXTS 602 (1981) [hereinafter cited
as COLLECTED TEXTS].
28. Some who have followed have taken the idea even further: the American Convention
on Human Rights, for example, provides an automatic right of individual petition without
need for any declaration by a Contracting Party: "Any person or group of persons, or any
nongovernmental entity legally recognised in one or more member states of the organisation,
may lodge petitions with the Commission containing denunciations or complaints of violation
of this Convention by a State Party." American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22,
1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, at 1, O.A.S. Off. Rec. OEA/Ser. L/V/II. 23, doc. 21, rev. 2 (English
1975), art. 44, reprttedin R. LILLICH, supra note 8, at 190.1, 190.12 [hereinafter cited as Am.
Cony. on Human Rights].
The American Convention was signed in 1969 and entered into force in July of 1978
on the deposit of the eleventh instrument of ratification. The states acceding to it are Barba-
dos, Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada,
Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, and Venezuela;
the failure of the United States to ratify this treaty has been a source of considerable concern.
It has to be admitted that to date there is little evidence that the adoption of the American
Convention has improved the protection of human rights in Central and Latin America. See
generally A. ROBERTSON, supra note 19, at 132-45.
Many of the rights protected under the European Convention also appear in the In-
ternational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which was adopted by the General As-
sembly of the United Nations in 1966 and came into force in 1976 with the deposit of the
thirty-fifth instrument of ratification. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
Dec. 16, 1966, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) at 49, 52, U.N. Doc.
A/6316 (1966), reprinted zn R. LILLICH, supra note 8, at 170.1. By December of 1982, 72 states
had ratified this instrument.
29. Eur. Cony. on Human Rights, supra note 8, art. 20; see also supra note 5.
30. Eur. Cony. on Human Rights, supra note 8, art. 21(1). Members of the Commission
serve for terms of six years, and may be reelected. Id. art. 22(1).
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taken."' Petitions also may not be anonymous, nor may they deal with
substantially the same matter as already was before the Commission or
another international body.32 The Commission's decision that a given
application is inadmissible is final and is not subject to appeal.33
When the Commission decides that an individual petition is admis-
sible, or when any High Contracting Party refers to it an alleged breach
of the Convention by another High Contracting Party, the Commission
proceeds to investigate the merits of the complaint. The primary pur-
pose of the Commission is to facilitate a friendly settlement between the
parties. 4 If it fails to bring about a friendly settlement, the Commission
forwards a report on the facts and its opinion on the merits of the case to
the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe. 5 Within a three
month period immediately after the Commission transmits its report to
the Committee of Ministers, a case may be referred to the European
Court of Human Rights.36 If it is not referred within that time, the
Committee of Ministers must decide by a two-thirds majority whether
the Convention was violated, and, if so, what actions must be taken
within what period of time.3 7 The Committee's decision is binding on
the High Contracting Parties. 8
In 1983 the Commission opened 3150 provisional files on the basis
of correspondence received, but only 499 applications ultimately were
registered for that year.39 Decisions as to admissibility were made re-
31. Id. art. 26.
32. Id. art. 27(1). Petitions found to be "incompatible" with the Convention, "manifestly
ill-founded, or an abuse of the right of petition" also are inadmissible. Id. art. 27(2).
33. MANUAL, supra note 1, at 268.
34. Article 28 provides in part that
[i]n the event of the Commission accepting a petition referred to it:
(a) it shall. . . undertake together with the representatives of the parties an
examination of the petition, and, if need be, an investigation . . . ; [and]
(b) it shall place itself at the disposal of the parties concerned with a view to
securing a friendly settlement of the matter on the basis of respect for Human
Rights as defined in this Convention.
Eur. Cony. on Human Rights, supra note 8, art. 28.
35. Id. art. 31(l)-(2).
The Committee of Ministers is composed of the ministers of foreign affairs of member
states or their alternates. It is "the executive organ of the Council of Europe .... " MAN-
UAL, supra note 1, at 20. The Committee of Ministers has ultimate authority over all internal
Council matters, subject to certain powers specifically granted to the Consultative Assembly.
See generall id. at 20-23. The Commission also must transmit a copy of its report to the state
or states concerned, for their information but not for publication. Eur. Cony. on Human
Rights, supra note 8, art. 31(2).
36. Eur. Cony. on Human Rights, supra note 8, arts. 32(1), 48; see infta notes 43-50 and
accompanying text.
37. Eur. Cony. on Human Rights, supra note 8, art. 32(l)-(2).
38. Eur. Cony. on Human Rights, supra note 8, art. 32(4).
39. ,Se EUROPEAN COMM'N ON HUMAN RIGHTS, STATISTICS 1983, DH (84) 1, at 11.
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garding 436 applications, and only 29 were declared admissible.'
There are a number of explanations for these figures. Many preliminary
letters were not followed up by correspondents, and others did not dis-
close even a provisional case of violation of the Convention. Upon in-
vestigation, many applications were found not to involve a violation of
the Convention. Other complainants did not comply with the exhaus-
tion requirements.
Those figures and the reasons for them are typical. Between its re-
ceipt of the first petitions in 1955 and the end of 1983, the Commission
had opened 25,308 provisional files. 4 1 It had registered 10,709 applica-
tions and had taken admissibility decisions on 9984 of which only 326
were declared admissible.42
B. The European Court of Human Rights-Its Jurisdiction andJudgments
One of the difficult issues that those who framed the European
Convention on Human Rights had to address was whether there should
be compulsory judicial review of claimed violations of the Convention.
The High Contracting Parties agreed that each of them should have an
opportunity to challenge another under the Convention, and that for
such a purpose the Commission of Human Rights was a necessary fo-
rum. But there is a difference between a commission able to review the
facts and perhaps steer the disputing parties towards a friendly settle-
ment, on the one hand, and a court with compulsory jurisdiction and
power to give binding judgment on the other. As with the right of indi-
vidual petition, so too on the issue of the compulsory jurisdiction a com-
promise was reached. Under article 46 of the Convention, signatory
40. Id
41. Id.
42. Id.
The rejected applications ran a gamut from those that may have had merit, but did
not disclose a violation of rights protected by the Convention, to the odd and the perverse.
They included a petition against Czechoslovakia, which is not a signatory to the Convention,
and one brought by the wife of Rudolph Hess, complaining of his detention in West Berlin
where the Convention has no application. See Application No. 262/57 v. Czech.; Application
No. 6231/73, Ilse Hess v. U.K. They also included a complaint that a sentence of detention
violated the applicant's right to leave the Federal Republic of Germany-an argument that,
had it succeeded, would have led to a rapid drop in the prison population-and another
complaint that denial of permission to leave prison to allow the applicant to secure a postage
stamp collection was a violation of his right to peaceful enjoyment of property. Another
applicant argued that laws protecting minors against sexual abuse interfered with his right to
private life. See Applications Nos. 5935/72, 3962/69, and 3099/67, all against Germany; see
also infra note 182 and accompanying text (referring to the European laws with respect to
homosexual relationships involving minors). See generally Andrews, Current Surve." Council of
Europe, I EUR. L. REV. 94, 94-96 (1975).
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states may make a special declaration accepting the compulsory jurisdic-
tion of the European Court of Human Rights (the Court), but they are
not subject to its jurisdiction unless they do so.43
The Court constitutes the second and final level of review under the
Convention for those cases that are referred to it. It currently consists of
twenty-one judges, each elected by a majority of the Consultative As-
sembly of the Council of Europe from among candidates nominated by
each member state.4 ' All candidates for the Court "must either possess
the qualifications required for appointment to high judicial office or be
jurisconsults of recognised competence."4 Judges on the Court are
elected for nine-year terms and may be re-elected.46 Matters brought
before the Court are heard either by the full Court or by a chamber
consisting of seven judges, including (as an ex officio member) the judge
who is the national of the member state involved.4 7
Cases may be referred to the Court only by the Commission or by
one of the High Contracting Parties-individuals have no right to take
their own cases to the Court.4' The Court's jurisdiction extends to "all
cases concerning the interpretation and application of the . . .Conven-
tion" that are referred to it properly,49 and its judgments are final and
not subject to appeal.5 °
43. Cf Am. Conv. on Human Rights, supra note 28, art. 62, which contains an almost
identical provision. Whereas all the states party to the European Convention, except Malta
and Turkey, have accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court, only four American
states had accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights by June of 1983: Costa Rica, Honduras, Peru, and Venezuela. It appears likely,
therefore, that for many years to come the European Court will be the principal body respon-
sible for developing an international jurisprudence of human rights.
44. Eur. Conv. on Human Rights, supra note 8, art. 38, provides that "[t]he European
Court of Human Rights shall consist of a number of judges equal to that of the Members of
the Council of Europe. No two judges may be nationals of the same State." Article 39(1)
provides that "[t]he members of the Court shall be elected by the Consultative Assembly by a
majority of the votes cast from a list of persons nominated by the Members of the Council of
Europe; each Member shall nominate three candidates, of whom two at least shall be its
nationals." Id art. 39(1). The judge elected from the list of Liechtenstein is a Canadian, but
all other current judges are nationals of member states.
45. Id. art. 39(3).
46. Id. art. 40(1).
47. Id art. 43. Rule 21 of the Court provides that, if more than one member state is
involved, every judge who is a national of a state party to the case sits as a member of the
Chamber. The president or vice-president of the Court also sits as a member ex officio, and
the remaining judges are chosen by lot. COLLECTED TEXTS, supra note 27, at 407-08.
48. Eur. Cony. on Human Rights, supra note 8, art. 44. Article 48 specifies which High
Contracting Parties may bring a case before the Court, provided that all the countries in-
volved either have recognised the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court or have consented to
come before it: the "Party whose national is alleged to be a victim; . .. [the] Party which
referred the case to the Commission; . . . [and the] Party against which the complaint has
been lodged." Id. art. 48.
49. Id. art. 45.
50. Id art. 52; MANUAL, supra note 1, at 279.
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By the end of 1983 the Court had rendered judgment in some sev-
enty cases. This is a fairly high number of judgments, considering that
as of that time many of the 326 applications admitted by the Commis-
sion were still before that body. It is primarily in the Court's judgments
that a European jurisprudence of human rights is being developed, and
it is primarily to those judgments that our focus will turn shortly. First,
however, we need to consider what individual rights are protected under
the Convention, and how they are defined.
C Prescription of the Rights Protected
We now return to the first point on which there were differences of
opinion among those negotiating the Convention: that is, whether the
protected rights should be merely enumerated or whether they should
be defined in some detail. Again a kind of compromise was reached,
although on the whole the rights are expressed in language that is broad
and open-textured.
Students of the United States Constitution are familiar with the
expression of rights in broad terms. Can rights be more boldly stated
than in the first amendment? "Congress shall make no law respecting
an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or
abridging the freedom of speech or of the press; or the right of the peo-
ple peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress
of grievances."5 The language of this amendment is very different from
the English tradition of legislation. It is the language of declaration
rather than of legislation. Its open texture requires a court construing it
to go beyond the normal compass of statutory interpretation and to be-
come involved in an act of legislative engineering. Active judicial in-
volvement is inevitable because no society can afford to tolerate absolute
freedom of speech or of the press. Every society needs to protect itself
and its members against the abuse of these freedoms, and therefore lines
must be drawn. Such broad language leaves that line-drawing function
to the courts.
Those who drafted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights for
the United Nations in 194852 dealt with the problem of specificity by
opting simply to list most of the rights protected, with relatively little in
the way of definition. For example, article 6 of the Universal Declara-
tion provides that "[elveryone has the right to recognition everywhere as
a person before the law," and article 9 that "[n]o one shall be subjected
to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile." A few of the Universal Declara-
51. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
52. See supra notes 17-20 and accompanying text.
1984]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
tion's articles do state their principles in more detail. This approach is
illustrated by article 25(1), which provides that
[e]veryone has the right to a standard of living adequate for
the health and well-being of himself and of his family, includ-
ing food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary so-
cial services, and the right to security in the event of
unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or
other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control.5"
The Universal Declaration gets around the problem of the seeming
absoluteness of the rights protected by means of a general qualification
in article 29. That article notes that every individual has certain duties
as well as rights and freedoms, and provides that the exercise of the
latter "shall be subject only to such limitations as are determined by law
solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the
rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirement of
morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic
society.""
The European Convention on Human Rights incorporates a
number of different approaches to the problem of broad statement ver-
sus narrow definition of rights. Its drafters made various compromises
and accommodations, resulting in a kind of hierarchy of human rights.
At the top of the hierarchy is a small number of rights that are stated
broadly, with no qualifications, and from which signatories may not
derogate. Article 3 is one of the provisions containing such preeminent
rights; it provides in unqualified boldness that "[n]o one shall be sub-
jected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment."
Similarly, article 4(1) provides that "[n]o one shall be held in slavery or
servitude." These and one or two other provisions are at the top of the
Convention's hierarchy in terms of providing near absolute protection.55
The bold declaration of these rights is a reaction to the worst excesses of
53. Universal Declaration, supra note 17, art. 25(1). See also, e.g., art. 11 on penal
offences.
54. Id. art. 29(2).
55. Article 15(2) also forbids derogation from article 7, which provides that "[n]o one
shall be held guilty of any criminal offence" for an act or omission that was not "a criminal
offence under national or international law" at the time when it was committed, nor may
anyone be assessed a heavier penalty than was applicable at that time. Derogation also is
forbidden with respect to article 2's right to life, "except in respect of deaths resulting from
lawful acts of war." Eur. Cony. on Human Rights, supra note 8, article 15(2). Article 2 also is
specifically qualified, however:
1. Everyone's right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of
his life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his
conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by law.
2. Deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in contravention of this
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the Second World War and, like the drafting of similar provisions in the
Universal Declaration, was intended to prevent any repetition of the
atrocities of which the world had just become fully aware.
The other rights and freedoms under the Convention are all quali-
fied in some way. Certain provisions have specific qualifications, such as
article 4(2): "No one shall be required to perform forced or compulsory
labour." No such freedom could be absolute, and thus it is qualified in
paragraph (3) which provides that the term "forced or compulsory la-
bour" shall not include work required to be done during the course of
lawful detention, compulsory military service or service required of con-
scientious objectors in lieu of military service, and service imposed in
connection with an emergency or calamity threatening the community
or as part of normal civic obligations. Similar detailed qualifications
may be found in articles 2 (the right to life)56 and 5(1) (the right to
liberty and security of person).57
Another group of qualified rights under the Convention have more
broadly-phrased qualifications. Article 8 is typical:
Article when it results from the use of force which is no more than absolutely
necessary:
(a) in defence of any person from unlawful violence;
(b) in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a person lawfully
detained;
(c) in action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a riot or insurrection.
Eur. Conv. on Human Rights, supra note 8, art. 2.
56. See supra note 55.
57. Article 5 provides, inter alia:
1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person.
No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in
accordance with a procedure prescribed by law:
a. the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent court;
b. the lawful arrest or detention of a person for non-compliance with the
lawful order of a court or in order to secure the fulfilment of any obligation pre-
scribed by law;
c. the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of
bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of hav-
ing committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent
his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so;
d. the detention of a minor by lawful order for the purpose of educational
supervision or his lawful detention for the purpose of bringing him before the com-
petent legal authority;
e. the lawful detention of persons for the prevention of the spreading of
infectious diseases, of persons of unsound mind, alcoholics or drug addicts or va-
grants;
f the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an un-
authorized entry into the country or of a person against whom action is being taken
with a view to deportation or extradition.
Eur. Conv. on Human Rights, supra note 8, art. 5.
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1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and
family life, his home and his correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority
with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance
with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the
interests of national security, public safety or the economic
well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or
crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protec-
tion of the rights and freedoms of others.
Such general qualifications clearly allow signatory states a great deal of
discretion to limit the scope of the rights or freedoms involved by apply-
ing their own substantive laws and standards.
Unlike the earlier Universal Declaration, the Convention also con-
tains a provision which allows derogation from its terms. Article 15(1)
provides that the contracting states may derogate from most of their
obligations under the Convention "[i]n time of war or other public
emergency threatening the life of the nation . . . to the extent strictly
required by the exigencies of the situation.""8 As noted above, however,
no derogation is permitted with respect to articles 3 (freedom from tor-
ture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment), 4(1) (free-
dom from slavery or servitude), and 7 (proscription against retrospective
creation of criminal offences)."
Finally, there are certain provisions in the Convention that are sub-
ject to derogation and were drafted in great detail. Examples of de-
tailed drafting are to be found in articles 6 (rights to fair process in the
determination of civil rights and obligations or criminal charges)6' and
5(2) ("Everyone who is arrested shall be informed promptly, in a lan-
58. This right of derogation has been exercised by the Republic of Ireland and the United
Kingdom in connection with the security problems posed by the Irish Republican Army
(IRA) and its offshoots, the Provisional IRA and the Irish National Liberation Army. E.g.,
1973 Y.B. EUR. CONV. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 24, 26; 1971 Y.B. EUR. CONy. ON HUMAN
RIGHTS 32; 1955-57 Y.B. EUR. CONy. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 47, 50. See also infra notes 105-13
and accompanying text. Other member states also have had occasion to derogate from the
obligations imposed on them by the Convention. Ste, e.g., 1978 Y.B. EUR. CONV. ON HUMAN
RIGHTS 20 (establishment of martial law in 13 districts in Turkey).
59. Eur. Cony. on Human Rights, supra note 8, art. 15(2); see supra note 55 and accompa-
nying text.
60. The European Convention on Human Rights provides:
1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge
against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable
time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall
be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part
of the trial in the interest of morals, public order or national security in a demo-
cratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of
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guage which he understands, of the reasons for his arrest and of any
charge against him").
In general, the rights and freedoms likely to be politically or so-
cially sensitive either were qualified or were phrased quite carefully by
the Convention's drafters. Article 8, for example, deals with privacy. It
is qualified broadly to allow High Contracting Parties a great deal of
latitude in taking domestic concerns into account. 6 ' The first protocol
to the Convention, which protects property rights and the rights to edu-
cation and free elections,6 2 reflects the alternative technique of very
careful drafting employed to a similar end.
The Council's member states had intended from the beginning to
provide protection for property, education, and election rights under the
Convention but, because there was initial difficulty in agreeing on a fi-
nal text, those rights were left to be added in the first protocol. The
difficulty is understandable in view of the political and social signifi-
cance of the rights involved. Education is an expensive social undertak-
ing, and if the right to education were to be interpreted as a right
enforceable against the state, it could result in substantial burdens on
the public exchequer. Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 therefore is worded
carefully: "No person shall be denied the right to education." It does
not impose an obligation on the state to provide education; indeed, this
is made clear in the very next sentence: "In the exercise of any functions
whzch it assumes in relation to education and to teaching, the State shall
respect the right of parents to ensure such education and teaching in
conformity with their own religious and philosophical convictions."63
the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in
special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice.
2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent
until proved guilty according to law.
3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum
rights:
a. to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in
detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him;
b. to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence;
c. to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choos-
ing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free
when the interests of justice so require;
d. to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the
attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as
witnesses against him;
e. to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or
speak the language used in court.
Id art. 6.
61. See supra text following note 57; see also infra text accompanying notes 125-28.
62. Protocol No. 1, supra note 10.
63. Id. art. 2 (emphasis added).
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Even more sensitive is the right to free elections. A phrase like "fair
and free elections" was ruled out by the United Kingdom Government
since that could require the institution of some form of proportional rep-
resentation to ensure a fair balance of representation. Article 3 of Proto-
col No. 1 therefore states instead that "[t]he High Contracting Parties
undertake to hold free elections at reasonable intervals by secret ballot,
under conditions which will ensure the free expression of the opinion of
the people in the choice of the legislature." It has been held repeatedly
that, whilst this means that electors must be free from any form of du-
ress or influence, and political parties must be free to mount campaigns
and put up candidates, there is no guarantee that every vote will be
equal.6 4 The language of the first protocol thus reflects the view that a
system of elections which requires fair and equitable weighting of votes
is not always the one which either the state or its citizens may wish to
have.6 5
The significance of the Convention's hierarchy of rights comes into
focus when one of those rights or freedoms must be given substance in a
particular case. What constitutes "inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment" within article 3 for example? Is it confined to the excesses
of Auschwitz and Birkenau? Is it to be measured by the standards of
1944? For that matter, what is meant by "the right to respect for...
private and family life" within article 8(1)? Is it the right to be safe
from state police hammering on the door in the middle of the night, or is
it to be interpreted in light of the much more highly developed sense of
privacy which prevails in the 1980's? The Convention itself does not
address these questions, but it does provide a structure which, though
not dispositive, may strongly influence the search for answers.
It is at least arguable that the substantive content of the rights or
obligations involved may more properly be construed broadly and be
found to change with the times in those articles in which the Convention
provides for a balancing of competing interests than in those in which
the Convention's terms are absolute and unqualified. The second para-
graph of article 8, for example, provides that the rights to privacy and to
family life may be interfered with in accordance with the law and as
64. See, e.g., The Liberal Party and Others v. U.K., 1981 Y.B. EUR. CONV. ON HUMAN
RIGHTS 320 (Eur. Comm'n of Human Rights), appl. no. 8765/79, 4 E.H.R.R. 106 (1980).
65. It is worth remembering in this connection that the relative weight of any given vote
cast for a member of the United States Senate varies greatly depending upon whether a given
voter is registered in a state with relatively few voters, such as Alaska (259,000 registered
voters in 1980) or a state with many voters, such as New York (7,870,000 registered voters in
1980). U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES:
1982-83, at 491 (103d ed. 1982). This is so because every state is represented by the same
number of Senators-two. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1.
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necessary to protect the rights of others or in the interests of public
safety, health or morals, national security, or economic well-being.
66
Given this broad qualification, the rights guaranteed may be construed
broadly and still allow judicial inquiry into the actions of signatory
states without unduly restricting the governments' options in particular
situations.
Where the right is not so broadly qualified, however, and especially
where the obligation in question may not be derogated from, the sub-
stantive meaning given to its terms could define what amounts to an
absolute right or obligation under the Convention. Article 3's guarantee
against torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment is
an example of an unqualified provision which may not be derogated
from. It is at least arguable that courts will feel or ought to feel con-
strained to keep their construction of that guarantee within rather nar-
row limits so as not to restrict unduly the governments bound by it.
Guarantees that are qualified to a limited extent, such as the right
to life in article 2 or the right to liberty and security of person in article
5," may fall somewhere between the two ends of the continuum sug-
gested above in terms of the flexibility permitted in their interpretation.
As the latter part of this article will make clear, the Commission
and the Court of Human Rights have not necessarily followed the
course suggested by this structural analysis of the Convention's guaran-
tees. It will be useful, nonetheless, to keep it in mind as a possible stan-
dard against which decisions may be measured. Before we turn to the
jurisprudence developing under the Convention, however, the addi-
tional issue of direct domestic enforcement of the Convention by the
states party to it must be addressed.
D. Enforcement of the Convention.: The Incorporation Question
The rights created under the European Convention on Human
Rights were intended to be real, but at the same time the primary obli-
gation for enforcement was left to the signatory states within their own
jurisdictions.6 8 Some states have incorporated the Convention into
66. See supra text following note 57.
67. See supra note 57; infra text accompanying notes 125-28.
68. Under article 1, "[t]he High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their
jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in . . . this Convention." Eur. Conv. on Human
Rights, supra note 8, art. 1.
As noted by Andrew Drzemczewski in his study of the impact of the Convention on
the domestic laws of the High Contracting Parties,
there is a variety of methods by which the substantive provisions of international
agreements can be incorporated into domestic law: treaties may be given the rank
of constitutional law by means of legislative enactment (and also possibly through
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domestic law. For example, once the Belgian Parliament authorised rat-
ification of the Convention and the government ratified it, the Conven-
tion's provisions were incorporated into Belgian domestic law under the
terms of the Belgian Constitution. As a result, the status of the Conven-
tion in Belgium is comparable to that of Belgian domestic legislation,
and individuals can pursue their rights under it in Belgian courts. The
fundamental nature of the rights and freedoms thus protected may be
limited, since under Belgian law any rules adopted by virtue of the rati-
fication of an international treaty may be overridden by subsequent leg-
islation, on the principle leges posteriores priores con/rarias abrogant.
69
Recently, however, there has been evidence that the Belgian courts may
be prepared to recognise a primacy for treaty laws where they conflict
with ordinary domestic law.70
In Austria the Convention has secured a more privileged position.
There it has the normative equivalency of constitutional law and its pro-
tections rank alongside the other guarantees of human rights contained
in the Austrian Constitution of 1920 and other Basic Law.7 1
Within the United Kingdom, the Republic of Ireland, Iceland, and
the Scandinavian countries, however, there has been no domestic adop-
tion of the European Convention on Human Rights.7 2 The obligations
of these states under the Convention remain essentially international
treaty obligations. English courts are not bound by the provisions of the
Convention, and the individual who feels that his rights have been vio-
judicial interpretation to this effect); they can acquire a rank equal to that of other
legislation; certain of their provisions may be applied by courts which consider them
to be 'directly applicable', or alternatively cited by them as persuasive authority.
Likewise, the provisions of international agreements can serve as guidelines for the
drafting of bills-to both the legislative and the administrative authorities-and
they can also be assumed to form part and parcel of 'general principles of law' or the
domestic 'ordre public' (in certain instances through the medium of customary inter-
national law) thereby influencing and modifying not only the practice of domestic
courts and tribunals, but also the action of executive and administrative authorities.
A. DRZEMCZEWSKI, supra note 8, at 60.
69. "Later laws abrogate prior laws that are contrary to them." BLACK's LAW DICTION-
ARY 809 (5th ed. 1979).
70. Andrew Drzemczewski suggests that the Convention "appear[s] to possess a hierarchi-
cally superior status to ordinary legislation" in Cyprus, France, Greece, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and Turkey, as well as in Belgium. A. DRZEMCZEWSKI, supra
note 8, at 189. He notes, however, that "the Belgian and Dutch courts have been particularly
active" in giving the Convention "extra-constitutional significance," id., and that several of
these other countries have failed to accept either the right of individual petition or the com-
pulsory jurisdiction of the Court, or both, id. at 189-90. See generally id. at 61-92, 142-45, 154-
70.
71. See generally id. at 93-106, 189. The Convention also has some constitution-like quali-
ties in Switzerland and Italy. Seegenerally id. at 116-24, 145-54, 189.
72. See generally id. at 125-41, 170-75, 177-87.
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lated in the United Kingdom must pursue his remedy before the Euro-
pean Commission. English courts do make a genuflection to the
Convention, however, in that they are prepared to look at its content if
there is doubt as to the scope and meaning of a provision of English
law.73 It has been said that in such a case the courts should interpret the
internal rule in a way that is consistent with the United Kingdom's obli-
gations under the Convention.
4
This situation has given rise to a long-running political debate in
the United Kingdom as to whether Parliament should take the positive
step of incorporating the Convention into domestic law.7 5 The issue
often is associated with arguments for a new constitutional settlement in
the United Kingdom, and to understand these arguments one must
have some knowledge of basic principles of British constitutional law.
The United Kingdom has no written constitution as such. 76 There
73. For other views and more in-depth consideration of how the courts of the United
Kingdom have dealt with the Convention, see Duffy, English Law and the European Convention on
Human Rights, 29 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 585 (1980).
74. British judges do not speak with one voice in their application of the Convention to
British law. Some judges have accepted the Convention and ruled in a manner completely
consistent with the Convention, see, e.g., Gleaves v. Deakin, [1979] 2 W.L.R. 665, 667-68, 2 All
E.R. 497, 498-99 (H.L.(E.)); (Article 10.2 of the Convention "requires that freedom of expres-
sion shall be untrammelled by public authority except . . . for the protection of the public
interest."); Reg. v. Secretary of State for the Home Dep't, exparte Bhajan Singh, [1976] 1 Q.B.
198, 202-03, [1975] 3 W.L.R. 225, 228-29, 61 I.L.R. 260, 262-63 (Q.B. Div'l Ct.), aft'd[1976] 1
Q.B. 198, 206-08, [1975] 3 W.L.R. 230, 230-32, 61 I.L.R. 264, 265-66 (C.A.) (recognizing
article 12 right to marry according to the laws of the particular country, subject to article 5
restrictions); Birdi v. Secretary of State for Home Affairs, 61 I.L.R. 250, 256-58 (Eng. C.A.
1975) (British courts should take the Convention into account in interpreting registration
under a presumption that Parliament did not intend to legislate contrary to the U.K.'s treaty
obligations; if a statute conflicts with the Convention, the Court might hold the statute inva-
lid). Others have merely cited to the Convention favorably or by analogy without actually
relying on it, see, e.g., Schering Chemicals, Ltd. v. Falkman, Ltd., [1982] 1 Q.B. 1, 18, [1981] 2
W.L.R. 848, 861 (C.A.); Ahmad v. Inner London Educ. Auth. (ILEA), [1978] 1 All E.R. 574,
577, 583 (C.A.) (also discussed infra text accompanying notes 77-83); Reg. v. Secretary of State
for the Home Dep't, exparte Hosenball, [1977] 1 W.L.R. 766, 779, [1977] 3 All E.R. 452, 457
(C.A.), 1 W.L.R. 789; Reg. v. Secretary of State for the Home Dep't, exparte Begum & Phan-
sopkar, [1976] 1 Q.B. 606, 626-28, [1975] 3 All E.R. 497, 511-12, 61 I.L.R. 390, 402-04 (C.A.
1975); Waddington v. Miah, [1974] 1 W.L.R. 683, 690-91, [1974] 1 W.L.R. 692, 694, 57 I.L.R.
175, 177 (H.L.(E.)); while other judges contend that the Convention has no weight or author-
ity under the British system, see, e.g., Attorney-General v. British Broadcasting Corp., [1981] 3
W.L.R. 109, 128 (C.A.), [1980] 3 W.L.R. 130, 137 (H.L.); U.K.A.P.E. v. A.C.A.S., [1980] 2
W.L.R. 254, 266-67 (H.L.(E.)); Malone v. Metropolitan Police Comm'r, [1979] Ch. 344, 362-
66, 378, [1979] 2 W.L.R. 700, 716-20, 731.
75. See, e.g., J. JACONELLI, ENACTING A BILL OF RIGHTS (1980); Samuels, The Argumentfor
a Bill of Rights in the United Kingdom, in HUMAN RIGHTs IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (J. An-
drews ed. 1982).
76.
The British constitution is partly unwritten and wholly flexible. Its basic
sources are legislative Acts of Parliament, such as the Act of Settlement, 1701, and
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is no clear separation of powers and no system of internal checks and
balances in its government. Parliament (consisting of the monarch as
head of state, the House of Lords, and the House of Commons) is sover-
eign. British constitutional rights are derived from constitutional con-
ventions, court decisions, and Acts of Parliament. The last of these may
at any time overrule the former. For the government of the day, if en-
sured of a clear majority in the House of Commons, this can mean virtu-
ally unchecked authority. The fact that human rights commonly are
recognised and protected within the United Kingdom is dependent
upon the good sense of the people and of successive governments and
not on written constitutional guarantees.
Proponents of a new constitutional settlement in the United King-
dom tend to fall into either of two groups. There are those who would
like to see the United Kingdom adopt a written constitution with a for-
mal system of checks and balances, as in the United States. Then there
are others who, although they would prefer to have a system of govern-
ment based on long-standing conventions rather than on a formal writ-
ten constitution, nevertheless would like to establish and entrench basic
fundamental rights and freedoms for the individual. Proponents of the
idea of entrenchment of human rights and freedoms come from both
sides of the political spectrum. Some see the entrenchment of rights as a
way of curbing any radical socialist engineering which a future left wing
government might seek to introduce, while others see it as a way of curb-
ing the excesses of a right wing government whose present or future poli-
cies towards minority groups may be discriminatory and intolerant.
These are political issues, and this is not the place to debate them.
No position will be taken here with respect to their merits. It is impor-
tant for our present purposes, however, to note that there would be very
real obstacles to incorporating the Convention into United Kingdom
law.
Many English judges would have great difficulty in interpreting the
Convention if it were to be incorporated into English law. The style of
the Convention is quite unfamiliar to English lawyers and judges, who
are used to precise draftsmanship and not to the open-textured language
of the Convention. Some may argue that it is by no means a foregone
conclusion that British lawyers would be unable to rise to the challenge
of interpreting the Convention's broader terms, and note that the quali-
decisions made by courts of law. Matters for which there is no formal law, as, for
instance, the resignation of office by a government, are determined by important
conventions of the constitution, based on precedent, but always open to develop-
ment or modification.
18 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA MACROPAEDIA 885 (15th ed. 1974).
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fying provisions noted earlier do provide some guidelines for interpreta-
tion. In this respect the decision of the Court of Appeal in Ahmadv. Inner
London Education Authorto77 is interesting.
Ahmad involved an appeal from the Employment Appeal Tribunal
by a teacher who had been denied time away from work on Fridays to
attend prayers at his local mosque. He had been offered and refused the
alternative of relinquishing his full-time appointment and taking a part-
time post. His appeal, which was dismissed, was based in part on his
rights under the 1944 United Kingdom Education Act. During argu-
ment, however, Lord Justice Scarman, drew attention to article 9 of the
Convention which guarantees "the right to freedom of thought, con-
science and religion . . . .""
Lord Denning, Master of the Rolls, who has had an honourable
track record for seeking to give the Convention as much effect as possi-
ble in English law, took the position that the Court of Appeal was not
bound by the Convention but should do its best to see that its decisions
should conform to the Convention as far as possible in law. He added,
however, that the words of article 9 are "vague terms that . . .can be
used for all sorts of unreasonable claims and provoke all sorts of litiga-
tion. As so often happens with high-sounding principles, they have to be
brought down to earth."7 9 He then went on to suggest that, whilst the
Court should uphold religious freedom to the full, the principle should
be applied with caution in the circumstances of the particular case, not-
ing that "I see nothing in the European Convention to give Mr. Ahmad
any rights to manifest his religion on Friday afternoons in derogation of
his contract of employment and certainly not on full pay. '"80
Lord Justice Orr, concurring with Lord Denning, drew attention to
the fact that rights under article 9 may be qualified to the extent "neces-
sary in a democratic society for the protection of the rights and freedoms
of others," and took the position that the right could not extend to pro-
tecting a teacher who sought to exempt himself from his responsibilities
77. [1978] 1 All E.R. 574 (C.A.).
78. The full text of article 9 provides as follows:
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion;
this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone
or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or
belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance.
2. Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs shall be subject only to
such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society
in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals,
or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
Eur. Cony. on Human Rights, supra note 8, art. 9.
79. [1978] 1 All E.R. at 577.
80. Id. at 578.
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during his contract of employment."'
Lord Justice Scarman, who often has argued for a Bill of Rights in
English law and has shown himself to be the judge most conscious of the
United Kingdom's international responsibilities and its domestic limita-
tions in the area of human rights, dissented from his fellow judges. He
thought their construction of the 1944 Act was in conflict with the prin-
ciples of a multi-racial society and with statutory protection of the indi-
vidual from discrimination. He went on to state that "against the
background of the European Convention, this is unacceptable, inconsis-
tent with the policy of modern statute law and almost certazhly a breach of
our international obligations.
8 2
As it turned out, Lord Justice Scarman was wrong. No doubt
prompted by what was said in court, Mr. Ahmad subsequently took his
complaint to the European Commission of Human Rights.8 3 The Com-
mission declared his petition inadmissible in March of 1981, quoting the
limitations in article 9(2) and stating that there had been no violation of
Mr. Ahmad's right to freedom of religion under article 9(l).84 It ap-
pears then that although there was a difference of opinion, two members
of the Ahmadcourt would have interpreted and applied article 9 in line
with the Commission's own interpretation and to the same result, had
they been called upon to apply the Convention in that case. The judge
who often is most in tune with the Convention got it wrong, however.
The real problem that would be faced by the English judges if the
Convention were incorporated into English law is not the relatively sim-
ple problem of construction seen in the Al4mad case. It would involve
instead the much greater difficulty of deciding to what extent the devel-
oping jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights should be
incorporated into English law. Without that jurisprudence the process
of incorporation would become increasingly less valuable in giving inter-
nal effect to the external responsibilities of the United Kingdom. Those
responsibilities are not simply to the static words of a 1950 text, but
rather to a dynamic and developing system of law which finds its expres-
sion principally in the decisions of the European Court of Human
Rights. If the United Kingdom sought to incorporate the entirety of the
jurisprudence under the Convention, it would have to give primacy to
81. Id. at 581 (quoting Eur. Conv. on Human Rights, supra note 8, art. 9(2)).
82. [1978] 1 All E.R. at 585 (emphasis added).
83. See Ahmad v. U.K., Eur. Ct. of Human Rights, 4 E.H.R.R. 126, sub noma. X v. U.K.,
22 Decisions & Reports 27 (Eur. Comm'n on Human Rights), appl. no. 8160/78 (1981).
84. 4 E.H.R.R. at 134-38. The Commission took into account the fact that Ahmad had
applied for the job knowing the conditions of service, that he had not disclosed that he might
require time off from school, and that time-tabling classes in order to accommodate him
would occasion severe difficulties for the school authorities. Id. at 135-36, paras. 12-19.
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the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights. That is not
something that English lawyers and the United Kingdom Parliament
are likely to entertain lightly. It also would mean giving binding au-
thority to a series of decisions couched in principles both more vague
and more general than those used by English lawyers, delivered by
judges who are much more prepared to accept the notion that laws may
have their own dynamic. These significant constitutional obstacles
would have to be overcome before incorporation could succeed.
One argument often advanced for incorporating the European
Convention on Human Rights into English law is that it would reduce
the number of complaints that go from the United Kingdom to the
Commission in Strasbourg each year. The argument is that incorpora-
tion would prevent the embarrassment of so many judgments being
given against the United Kingdom Government by the Court since it
would reduce the number of applications deposited with the
Commission.
The United Kingdom has suffered a comparatively large number of
adverse decisions in proceedings before the Court."5 In this respect it is
interesting to note that the United Kingdom also has had a large
number of applications made against her. Of 590 applications regis-
tered by the Commission in 1982, 190 were deposited against the United
Kingdom; a further 98 were registered against Germany, 93 against
France, and 42 against Switzerland. 6
Of course the number of applications registered does not necessarily
reflect the failure of the respondent state to respect human rights. It
may reflect in part the extent to which influential, well-financed, and
determined pressure groups within a particular society are prepared to
use the Strasbourg machinery to support their arguments for reform of
executive practises and legislative discriminations.8 7 Moreover, the
large number of applications registered against the United Kingdom in
1982 was not entirely typical. In 1980 the Commission registered 103
85. See, e.g., Jensen, The Impact of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights on
National Law, 52 U. CIN. L. REV. 760, 769-70 (1983); Kidd, 'Twas Easier Said Than Done':
Britain and the European Convention on Human Rights, 14 MELB. U.L. REV. 104, 105 (1983). The
Jensen article provides a table of the number of cases heard and the negative judgments
involved in proceedings of the Court and the Committee of Ministers during the period 1959-
1982. According to the figures presented, the United Kingdom was involved in more cases
(nine before the Court, 11 before the Committee) and received more adverse decisions (eight
from the Court, six from the Committee) than any other signatory state during those years.
86. See EUROPEAN COMM'N OF HUMAN RIGHTS, STATISTICS 1982, DH (83)6 table 2.1.
For a statistical breakdown of the number of individual applications -filed against
signatory states during the period 1957-1981, and a discussion of some of the possible factors
involved, see Jensen, supra note 85, at 767-69.
87. Cf. Kidd, supra note 85, at 107 (noting the large number of organisations and pressure
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applications against the United Kingdom and 106 against the Federal
Republic of Germany,"' yet the Convention became internally applica-
ble as the domestic law of the Federal Republic Germany on September
3, 1953.' 9  Similarly, the Convention has direct application in
Belgium,90 and yet almost as many cases have been brought against her
in the European Court of Human Rights as against the United King-
dom. Like the United Kingdom, moreover, Belgium's record in that
court is poor.
9
'
groups in Britain as one possible mitigating factor in the large number of applications
brought against her).
The situation of the United Kingdom in this respect may be contrasted with that of
the Republic of Ireland. Republican extremism apart, Ireland has until recently been some-
thing of a quiet backwater. Her relative isolation from the major social and cultural changes
occurring in European society since the early 1960's is evidenced by, among other things, the
fact that the Irish Constitution still contains much of the dogma associated with European
clericalism. There are signs in some parts of Irish society, however, of an emerging dissatisfac-
tion with legal restraints on the provision of contraception, abortion, and divorce. See infia
notes 186-97 and accompanying text. It is interesting to note that whereas very few applica-
tions against Ireland had been filed with the Commission other than those of zealous Repub-
licans eager to advance the cause of the I.R.A., the number of applications from other parties
is growing: from four in 1980 to nine in 1981 and 23 in 1982. This may well signal the
beginning of developments more in line with changes in the United Kingdom and elsewhere
in Europe.
88. See EUROPE COMM'N ON HUMAN RIGHTS, STATISTICS 1982, DH (83)6 table 2. 1.
89. Set A. DRZEMCZEWSKI, supra note 8, at 109.
90. See supra note 70.
91. In quite a few of the cases brought against Belgium within the past 20 years the Court
has found some violation of the Convention. Set, e.g., Albert Case, Eur. Ct. of Human Rights,
ser. A, no. 58, 5 E.H.R.R. 533 (1983) (arts. 6(1), 11); Van Droogenbroeck Case, Eur. Ct. of
Human Rights, ser. A, no. 50, 4 E.H.R.R. 443 (1982) (failure to provide review of lawfulness
of detention held to violate art. 5(4)); Le Compte Case, 1981 Y.B. EUR. CONV. ON HUMAN
RIGHTS 434 (Eur. Ct. of Human Rights), ser. A., no. 43, 4 E.H.R.R. I (procedural deficien-
cies in professional disciplinary proceedings held to violate art. 6(1)); Deweer Case, 1980 Y.B.
EUR. CONy. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 464 (Eur. Ct. of Human Rights), ser. A, no. 35, 2 E.H.R.R.
439 (provisional closure of defendant's business coerced him to pay a fine in "friendly settle-
ment" of the charges against him and therefore violated art. 6(1)); Marckx Case, 1979 Y.B.
EUR. CONY. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 410 (Eur. Ct. of Human Rights), ser. A, no. 31, 2 E.H.R.R.
330 (Belgium's illegitimacy laws held to violate arts. 8, 14; art. I of Protocol No. 1); De Wilde
Case (no. 1), 1971 Y.B. EUR. CONY. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 788 (Eur. Ct. of Human Rights), ser.
A, no. 12, 1 E.H.R.R. 373 (detention by administrative order without judical review held to
violate art. 5(4)); Belgian Linguistics Cases (nos. 1-2), 1968 Y.B. EUR. CONV. ON HUMAN
RIGHTS 832 (Eur. Ct. of Human Rights), ser. A, nos. 5-6, 1 E.H.R.R. 241, 252 (1967-68)
(legislation precluding access to French-language schools on basis of parental residence held
to violate art. 14, read in conjunction with art. 2 of Protocol No. 1); see also Jensen, supra note
85, at 770 table 2.
Of course, violations have not been found in some cases brought against Belgium. See,
e.g., National Union of Belgian Police Case, 1979 Y.B. EUR. CONV. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 294
(Eur. Ct. of Human Rights), ser. A, no. 19, 1 E.H.R.R. 578 (1975) (Belgian legislation provid-
ing for consultation only with designated trade unions "on proposals concerning the status
and working conditions" of public sector employees held not to violate art. 11(1)); Delcourt
Case, 1970 Y.B. EUR. CONV. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 1100 (Eur. Ct. of Human Rights), ser. A,
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It is not difficult to see the reason why applications still come to
Strasbourg from those states in whose courts the Convention can be
pleaded. In Germany the Convention does not prevail over Basic Law.
It has the same status as any other federal law and is subject to the
general rule leges posteriores priores contrarias abrogant.9 2 Similarly, al-
though there is a presumption in Belgium that Acts of Parliament are
intended to be in conformity with the Constitution and with treaty obli-
gations, including obligations under the Convention, until recently the
Belgian courts have hesitated to interfere with the doctrine of the
supremacy of Parliament by reviewing the legality or constitutionality
of Acts of Parliament.9 3
While the United Kingdom has a poor record, therefore, in terms of
the number of applications registered against it and the number of find-
ings made against it by the European Court of Human Rights, its vul-
nerability to the procedures under the Convention is neither unique nor
clearly the result of non-incorporation per se.
The solution to the problem of incorporation ultimately may be
prompted by practical considerations of the best use of limited re-
sources. Under the current system an individual is not allowed to plead
his rights under the Convention before an English court, but instead has
to suffer judgment against him before he is permitted to go to Stras-
bourg to seek amends for any violation of his rights under the Conven-
tion. This process is expensive, complicated, and protracted.
Incorporation may be the most efficient and effective approach to pro-
tection of human rights in the long run, even though experience has
shown that incorporation may not result in a drastic reduction in the
number of applications submitted and judgments given against an in-
corporating state.
III. JURISPRUDENCE UNDER THE CONVENTION
Having reviewed the origins and structure of the European Con-
vention on Human Rights, and having considered different approaches
to its enforcement, we shall turn now to an examination of how the
Convention has been interpreted in particular instances. We shall see
how the Court and the Commission have extended the substantive pro-
tection afforded by certain of its provisions, and how the meaning and
impact of the Convention as a whole have evolved or developed over
no. 11, 1 E.H.R.R. 355 (legislation which permitted a member of the tProcureur General's de-
partment to attend the private deliberations of the Court of Cassation held not to violate art.
6(1)).
92. See A. DRZEMCZEWSKI, supra note 8, at 106-15.
93. Id. at 63-70.
1984]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
time. Some cases will be considered according to the subject matter
involved, such as early decisions in the area of pre-trial detention and
detention without trial and cases dealing with questions of access to ju-
dicial process. The concept of "margin of appreciation" will be ex-
plained and illustrated with reference to a number of cases that raised
questions about the interface between the Convention and the substan-
tive laws of signatory states. Finally, the effect of changing social norms
and mores on the interpretation of the Convention will be examined in
the context of selected decisions to date and possible future
developments.
A. Detention Before or Without Trial
The earliest decisions of the European Court of Human Rights sug-
gested that a majority of judges were reluctant to give wide application
to the protections contained in the Convention. Some of its early deci-
sions appear very conservative indeed to a student of English common
law, especially a series of cases in which the court was prepared to toler-
ate substantial delays in the determination of criminal charges.
The applicant in Wemhof v. Federal Republic of GermanyP4 was
charged and arrested in November of 1961 but was not convicted until
April of 1965."5 His subsequent appeal against the conviction was re-
jected in December of 1965.96 In Neumeister v. Austria,9 7 a preliminary
investigation by the Austrian authorities began in 1959, the applicant
first was interrogated in 1960, and first charged and taken into custody
in 1961.98 His trial began in 1964 and judgment still had not been given
when the case first came before the European Court in 1968."9 The
Court was not prepared to hold that article 6(1), under which a person
is entitled to have criminal charges against him determined "within a
reasonable time," had been violated in either of these cases.' 0 0
Admittedly, the charges in Neumeister were complicated, and the
94. 1968 Y.B. EUR. CONV. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 796 (Eur. Ct. of Human Rights), ser. A,
no. 7, 1 E.H.R.R. 55.
95. 1 E.H.R.R. at 59, para. 4, 63, para. 12.
96. Id. at 64, para. 15.
97. Neumeister v. Aus. (no. 1), 1968 Y.B. EUR. CONY. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 812 (Eur. Ct.
of Human Rights), ser. A, no. 8, 1 E.H.R.R. 91.
98. 1 E.H.R.R. at 95-96, paras. 4-7.
99. Id. at 108, para. 24, 130, para. 19.
100. Article 6(1) provides, inter alia, that "[i]n the determination of ... any criminal
charge against him, everyone is entitled to a . ..hearing within a reasonable time by [a]
tribunal .... " Eur. Cony. on Human Rights, supra note 8, art. 6(1). The Court held in the
first Neume'stercase that the period in question begins when a person is charged, 1 E.H.R.R. at
130, para. 18, and in Wemhoffthat it "lasts at least until acquittal or conviction, even if this
decision is reached on appeal," 1 E.H.R.R. at 78, para. 18. The relevant period at the time
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Court did hold unanimously that Neumeister's pre-trial detention of
over two years was excessive in the circumstances and a breach of the
applicant's right under article 5(3) to be tried within a reasonable time
or to be released pending trial."0 ' But that holding went only to the
length of pre-trial detention and not to delay in proceeding with the
case. In a number of other applications of this sort, both the Commis-
sion and the Court have applied standards of procedural expedition that
would horrify an English lawyer, although both bodies have shown a
greater and, from the English perspective, a more proper concern about
the length of pre-trial detention."2
Among the more interesting features of these early cases were the
dissenting opinions of Judge Zekia from Cyprus. In Judge Zekia's view,
the Convention's drafters aimed to set common standards for the free-
dom and safety of persons throughout the territories of the member
states of the Council of Europe. In Wemhoff he specifically noted the
Convention's preamble, which states that the European countries are
"likeminded and have a common heritage of political traditions, ideals,
freedom and the rule of law . . .,"0' He also drew attention to the
vast differences in practice between common law and continental sys-
tems of trial and suggested that, whilst the signatories of the Convention
would not have had it in mind to assimilate either the inquisitorial or
the accusatorial system of trial or to seek to change the procedures
adopted in the courts of member states, they might fairly be inferred to
have intended to set common standards of liberty and expedition which
would not vary vastly from one country to another. 104
of the Court's decision in Neumeister was over seven years and lengthening, since no judgment
had yet been entered in the Austrian prosecution of the applicant.
101. 1 E.H.R.R. at 133, para. 25.
Article 5(3) provides that
[e]veryone arrested or detained in accordance with . ..paragraph l(c) of
this Article [see supra note 57] shall be brought promptly before a judge or other
officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial
within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by
guarantees to appear for trial [i.e. by the requirement of posting bond].
Eur. Cony. on Human Rights, supra note 8, art. 5(3).
102. In addition to Neumeisler, see Ringeissen v. Aus., 1971 Y.B. EUR. CONY. ON HUMAN
RIGHTS 838 (Eur. Ct. of Human Rights), ser. A, no. 13, 1 E.H.R.R. 455 (total detention of
applicant for over two and a quarter years held to exceed a reasonable time in violation of
article 5(3), since justifications offered for his continued detention by the Austrian govern-
ment were found to be without a basis in fact); Stogmuller v. Aus., 1969 Y.B. EUR. CONV. ON
HUMAN RIGHTS 364 (Eur. Ct. of Human Rights), ser. A, no. 9, 1 E.H.R.R. 155 (total deten-
tion of two years and seven weeks held to have violated article 5(3), as there were found to
have been no dangers present sufficient to warrant refusal of provisional release pending
trial).
103. Wemhoff, I E.H.R.R. at 88-89, para. 19 (Zekia, J., dissenting).
104. Id. at 88-89, paras. 17-20. Opinions such as his Wemhoffdissent have led Professor
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In another case the Court early showed itself to be loath to restrict
the ability of a signatory state to deal with threats posed by terrorism.
The applicant in Lawless v. Repub/ic of Ireland,1°5 a member of the IRA,
had been detained without trial by order of the Irish Minister of Justice
under the Offences Against the State Act. That Act made the IRA an
unlawful organisation in Ireland and made belonging to it an offence.
The Act also granted the police extensive powers to stop, search, interro-
gate, and arrest suspects, and provided that any minister of state, if satis-
fied that a person had been involved in unlawful activities, could order
his detention without trial. This last-mentioned power was made de-
pendent upon the government's publishing a proclamation to the effect
that the special powers of detention were "necessary to secure the preser-
vation of public peace and order."' 6
During the years 1954-57 the IRA carried out a number of attacks
on Northern Ireland's police barracks and border patrols and on certain
targets in the Irish Republic as well. The Republic responded by issu-
ing a proclamation under the Act in July of 1957. Lawless had been
arrested twice prior to the July proclamation, including once when he
and three others were found to be in possession of a small armoury. On
that occasion Lawless was acquitted on charges of unlawful possession of
firearms and of being a member of the IRA, despite the fact that he
admitted membership of the IRA. He was arrested again some months
later, convicted, and served a short sentence. Finally he was re-arrested
and detained for some five months under the special powers, before be-
ing released. 10
7
His detention in the last-noted instance was a clear breach of his
right to liberty under the Convention since its lawfulness was not speed-
ily decided by a Court as required by article 5(3).I"8 There also was an
equally clear breach of his right under article 6(1) to have criminal
Morrisson to characterize Judge Zekia as "present[ing] the clearest case for [judicial] activism
• . . on the Court." C. MORRISSON, JR., THE DYNAMICS OF DEVELOPMENT IN THE EURO-
PEAN HUMAN RIGHTS CONVENTION SYSTEM 15 (1981). It is interesting to note that since the
Neumei'ter and Wemboff decisions both the Austrian and German governments have intro-
duced new rules to reduce the time spent in custody awaiting criminal trial and have at-
tempted to speed up their procedures for bringing accused persons to trial. See COUNCIL OF
EUROPE, STOCK-TAKING ON THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 45 (1982);
Jensen, supra note 85, at 782-84. On the German reforms, see Madlener, The Protection of
Human Rights in the Criminal Procedure of the Federal Republ c of Gemany, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (J. Andrews, ed. 1982).
105. 1961 Y.B. EUR. CONV. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 430 (Eur. Ct. of Human Rights), ser. A,
nos. 1-3, 1 E.H.R.R. 1, 13, 15 (1960-61). Lawless was the first case in which the European
Court of Human Rights rendered an opinion.
106. 1 E.H.R.R. at 17, para. 3.
107. Id. at 18-19, para. 4.
108. See supra note 101.
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charges against him determined within a reasonable time. The Irish
Government argued, however, that since his intention was to destroy the
rights of others he could not plead these articles in his own favour. 0 9
The Court rejected this argument on the ground that his right to have
the lawfulness of his detention determined was not in conflict with the
rights of others, even though his actions may have been.
If the Irish Government's derogation from its obligations under ar-
ticle 15 of the Convention had not been valid, therefore, the government
would have breached those obligations in the Lawless case." 0 Address-
ing the validity of the Irish derogation, the Court reasoned that the
phrase "public emergency threatening the life of the nation" in article
15(1) clearly referred to "an exceptional situation of crisis or emergency
which affects the whole population and constitutes a threat to the or-
ganised life of the community of which the State is composed.""' In
the judges' unanimous view the Irish Government had reasonably de-
duced that there was such a threat to the life of the nation, arising in
part from the existence of "a secret army engaged in unconstitutional
activities and using violence to attain its purposes."'1 2 The Court also
noted that there had been an "alarming increase in terrorist activities"
between 1956 and 1957, and that insofar as the IRA was operating
outside the Republic its activities had seriously jeopardised the Repub-
lic's relationship with the United Kingdom."' The Court then inquired
into whether the measures taken were limited to what was strictly re-
quired by the exigencies of the situation and, after reviewing the facts,
concluded that the Irish Government had reacted reasonably.
109. The Irish Government was relying on Eur. Conv. on Human Rights, supra note 8, art.
17, which states:
Nothing in this Convention may be interpreted as implying for any State,
group or person any right to engage in any activity or perform any act aimed at the
destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth herein or at their limitation to
a greater extent than is provided for in the Convention.
1 E.H.R.R. at 20-21, paras. 3-5.
110. Article 15(1) provides that
[i]n time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation
any High Contracting Party may take measures derogating from its obligations
under this Convention to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situa-
tion, provided that such measures are not inconsistent with its other obligations
under international law.
Eur. Conv. on Human Rights, supra note 8, art. 15(1). Under article 15(3) the High Con-
tracting Parties which avail themselves of the right to derogate must keep the Secretary-
General of the Council of Europe "fully informed" of the measures taken and the reasons
therefor, and also inform him when such measures are no longer in effect. Id. art. 15(3).
111. 1 E.H.R.R. at 31, para. 28.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 32, para. 30.
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Whether the IRA really represented a threat to the stability of the
Irish Republic is doubtful. It clearly was an embarrassment, however,
all the more so because of the unpredictability of Irish juries when try-
ing cases involving IRA members.' 14 Had the European Court of
Human Rights adopted a rigorous interpretation of the Convention so
as to maximise the protection of human rights, it might have found for
Lawless at the price of embarrassing the Irish government. The Court
instead adopted more moderate standards, thereby preserving greater
authority and flexibility for the domestic government.
B. Access to Justice
Compared to the Court's relatively conservative stance on the issue
of the speed of trial in cases like Wemhoffand Neumezster, it has taken a
much more active approach in promoting the principle of access to jus-
tice. The United Kingdom is among the signatory states that have suf-
fered adverse decisions in this area. In her case, lack of judicial control
over the exercise of executive power by the United Kingdom Home Of-
fice, coupled with a kind of administrative obtuseness which character-
ises certain actions taken by that department, have resulted in a series of
applications under the Convention.
Golder v. United Kingdom 5 was the first application from the United
Kingdom to reach the Court. The applicant was a convicted man who
had been identified as having been involved in a serious disturbance in
the prison in which he was serving his sentence. The prison governor
and the Home Secretary, exercising their powers under the Prison
Rules,' 1 6 prevented him from writing to his Member of Parliament and
from consulting a solicitor with a view to initiating civil libel proceed-
ings. The Court's opinion in Golder showed that it was prepared to give
a very positive interpretation to the following phrase in article 6(1): "In
the determination of his civil rights and obligations. . . everyone is en-
titled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an in-
dependent and impartial tribunal established by law." The Court held
that this language imported not only requirements of fairness, openness,
and speed of judicial process, but also a fundamental right of access to
that process. The majority opinion noted that, while article 6(1) "does
114. In addition to the problem of political sympathisers, Irish juries sometimes are influ-
enced by fear of IRA reprisals.
115. 1975 Y.B. EUR. CONy. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 290 (Eur. Ct. of Human Rights), ser. A,
no. 18, 1 E.H.R.R. 525.
116. The Prison Rules, "which were laid before Parliament and have the status of a statu-
tory instrument," were drafted by the Home Secretary pursuant to statutory authorisation.
Colder, 1 E.H.R.R. at 527-28, para. 17.
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not state a right of access to the courts or tribunals in express terms,"1 '
the language of that article must be interpreted in light of the "rule of
law" mentioned in both the Convention's preamble and the Statute of
the Council of Europe. 118
In the Golder Court's view it is a fundamental principle of law that
"a civil claim must be capable of being submitted to a judge;'" 9 indeed,
"in civil matters, one can scarcely conceive of the rule of law without
there being a possibility of having access to the courts."12 ° Were article
6(1) to be construed otherwise than so as to give a right of access to a
court or tribunal, the Court reasoned, signatory states could abolish
their courts or remove the protection of judicial impartiality from cer-
tain sorts of civil actions, resulting in a state of affairs "repugnant" to
fundamental principles of law.' 2 1 It followed from that reasoning that,
insofar as the Home Secretary impeded Golder from bringing legal pro-
ceedings by preventing him from contacting his solicitor, the Secretary
had violated Golder's rights under the Convention.1 2
Judge Fitzmaurice of the United Kingdom argued in his dissenting
opinion that it was wrong to seek to develop the Convention by inter-
pretation, especially since that instrument was the outcome of a process
of international agreement and compromise rather than an act of legis-
lative sovereignty. The former sort of agreement, in his view, requires
"an interpretation that [has] . . .a positive foundation in the conven-
tion that alone represents what the parties have agreed to-a positive
foundation either in the actual terms of the convention or in inferences
necessarily to be drawn from [them] . - 2."'2 His reasoning was re-
jected by the majority of judges on the Court, who instead took the view
that it was essential to construe article 6(1) so as to fill a gap that those
117. Id. at 532, para. 28.
118. Id. at 534-36, paras. 34-35.
119. Id. at 535, para. 35.
120. Id., para. 34.
121. Id. at 536, para. 35.
122. This presupposes that, as the Court in fact held, a hindrance to the exercise of a
protected right may constitute a violation of the Convention just as a legal impediment to the
exercise of such a right would do. Id. at 531, para. 26.
123. Id at 562-63, para. 32 (Fitzmaurice, J., dissenting).
Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, a frequent dissenter while he was on the Court, showed him-
self to be very conservative in his attitude toward the development of the Convention. His
opinions indicate that this was not the result of a desire on his part to limit the Convention's
effectiveness as a source of protection of human rights, but rather a consequence of his tradi-
tional English approach to the construction of international instruments coupled with his
experience as an international lawyer in the service of the United Kingdom Foreign Office.
See, e.g., id. at 562-67, paras. 32-39. Judge Fitzmaurice also challenged the logical premises of
the majority opinion in Colder. Id. at 563-65, paras. 33-37.
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who negotiated the Convention could not conceivably have intended.' 2 4
More recently, related decisions of the Court have put a good deal
of pressure on the United Kingdom to establish full and proper rights
for mentally disordered detainees to obtain judicial review of the lawful-
ness of their continued detention. This line of the Court's jurisprudence
began to be developed in the case of Winterwerp v. Netherlands.'2 5 Article
5 of the Convention provides that everyone has the right to liberty and
shall not be deprived of this right save in certain defined cases, such as
the lawful detention of persons of unsound mind. In all cases where a
person is arrested or otherwise detained, however, article 5(4) imposes
an overriding obligation on the state: "Everyone who is deprived of his
liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by
which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a
court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful." The Court
noted in the W'nterwerp case that, except in emergency cases, three mini-
mum conditions must be satisfied for the lawful detention of a person of
unsound mind: (1) it must be established by a competent authority, on
the basis of objective medical expertise, that the individual is suffering
from a genuine mental disorder; (2) the mental disorder must be of a
sort that warrants compulsory confinement; and (3) the confinement
should continue only during the persistence of the disorder necessitating
it. 126
The subsequent case of X v. Unted Kingdom 12 concerned an appli-
cant who had been detained in a secure mental hospital following a
criminal conviction for the offence of wounding with intent to cause
grievous bodily harm. He later received a conditional discharge but was
reconfined as the result of an administrative decision by the Home Sec-
retary after X's wife reported to his probation officer that he had be-
come deluded and threatening. Despite the fact that there was no doubt
that the Home Secretary's action was taken in response to an emer-
gency, the Court took the position that it was essential to ensure that X's
continued detention was necessary and fairly imposed. In the Court's
view this required that the detainee be entitled to periodic proceedings
by which the lawfulness of his detention could be determined by a court
and his release ordered promptly if the detention were found not to be
lawful. In a passage which is very relevant to the rights of anyone de-
124. Id. at 536, para. 35.
125. 1979 Y.B. EUR. CONY. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 426 (Eur. Ct. of Human Rights), ser. A,
no. 47, 2 E.H.R.R. 387.
126. 2 E.H.R.R. at 403, para. 39.
127. 1981 Y.B. EUR. CONV. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 450 (Eur. Ct. of Human Rights), ser. A,
no. 46, 4 E.H.R.R. 188.
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tained by reason of a mental disorder, the Court held that, even if a
detention is originally pursuant to the decision of a court,
a person of unsound mind compulsorily confined in a psychiat-
ric institution for an indefinite or lengthy period is in principle
entitled, at any rate where there is no automatic periodic re-
view of a judicial character, to take proceedings at reasonable
intervals before a court to put in issue the 'lawfulness' (within
the meaning of the Convention. . .) of his detention, whether
that detention was ordered by a civil or criminal court or by
some other authority.' 28
The Court went on to say that its province is not to determine "the
best or most appropriate system of judicial review," and that the con-
tracting states are "free to choose different methods of performing their
obligations. ' 129 The United Kingdom Government's response was to in-
troduce an amendment to the Mental Health Bill, proceeding through
Parliament at the time, to provide mental patients with a right to regu-
lar review of the propriety of their continued detention.
Anyone familiar with the extent to which the United Kingdom's
civil service in general, and the Home Office in particular, has sought to
preserve its executive authority free from judicial review can only ap-
prove the impact of this decision. The jurisprudence of the Convention
at long last is forcing beams of light into some of the more cobwebbed
corners of bureaucratic decision making, ensuring a minimum degree of
protection for some of society's most vulnerable members. It may be
granted that many people detained on grounds of mental disorder are
dangerous and others need to be protected within institutions, but too
many cases have come to light in the United Kingdom in which persons
have languished in mental hospitals for years in consequence of initial
medical authorisation. The fact that some of them undoubtedly would
or will have great difficulty in returning to the community upon release
should not cause any society to tolerate the unlimited continuation of
institutionalisation without any regular process of review.
C Margin of Appreciation
Cases like Golder, Winterwerp, and Xv. United Kingdom are unlikely to
promote turmoil outside the ranks of government. Most people will
recognise the principles of fairness underlying the Court's reasoning.
But in recent years the Court has been presented with a number of cases
128. 4 E.H.R.R. at 207, para. 52. This passage substantially expands the scope of protec-
tion under article 5(4).
129. Id. at 207, para. 53.
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in which it has had to consider the impact of the Convention on the
substantive law of member states. As the "high-sounding principles" (to
use Lord Denning's phrase) of the European Convention have been
brought down to earth, they frequently have arrived with a rather sub-
stantial thump. The principal dynamic has been a development of the
reasoning adopted by Judge Zekia in the Wemhoff case. The Court is
looking increasingly at the social and legal practices of member states to
identify norms which it is prepared to apply. As the laws and social
conventions of a predominant number of states change and develop, so
too the norms applied by the Court are developed. This "dynamic" in
the jurisprudence of the Court is having a substantial impact on the
laws of the United Kingdom and other countries. We shall see shortly
how it is developing and how it affects the social and cultural proscrip-
tions of Western European society by looking at some recent decisions of
the Court. Before doing so, however, some attention must be paid to the
concept of "margin of appreciation" as it is used by the Court.
The phrase "margin of appreciation" is borrowed from French ad-
ministrative law, in which it is used to describe the extent to which a
court will make allowance for the exercise of discretion by a person ful-
filling an administrative responsibility. In the context of the Conven-
tion, "margin of appreciation" refers to the discretion left to domestic
legislators, courts, and executives in creating, interpreting, and applying
the laws of their own society. The Court has taken the position that the
extent to which the provisions of the Convention allow for a margin of
appreciation varies. This seems appropriate; certainly it would be diffi-
cult to argue that article 3, which forbids torture or inhuman or degrad-
ing treatment or punishment, allows much margin of appreciation of
the contracting state. On what ground could one state be afforded
greater latitude than another to beat or ill-treat its citizens? Where
other and somewhat less absolute rights or obligations under the Con-
vention are concerned, on the other hand, the appropriate breadth of a
margin of appreciation is not so clear.
Handyside v. United Kingdom 3 ° was an example of a less-than-clear-
cut case. It involved a publication entitled The Little Red School Book,
which was aimed at teenagers and, in addition to stressing certain polit-
ical and social viewpoints, contained references to the innocence of
smoking cannabis and the harmless pleasure to be derived from pornog-
raphy."3 ' Handyside, the book's publisher, had been fined and copies of
130. 1976 Y.B. EUR. CONV. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 506 (Eur. Ct. of Human Rights), ser. A,
no. 24, 1 E.H.R.R. 737.
131. See, e.g., 1 E.H.R.R. at 746-49, paras. 31-34. Among the book's features noted by the
Court in its summary of the English trial court's treatment of the case was the suggestion that
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the book destroyed as a result of a prosecution under the Obscene Publi-
cations Acts of 1959 and 1964.132
The Handyside Court found that the attitudes of European states
toward the censorship of literature varied considerably, t33 and against
this background it was prepared to allow a relatively wide margin of
appreciation under article 10 of the Convention. That article protects
the right to freedom of expression, but also states that such freedom
carries with it certain responsibilities and that its exercise may be sub-
ject to limits imposed by law where necessary for, inter alia, the protec-
tion of health and morals.' 34 The Court recognised that a substantial
degree of discretion must be left to states in determining what amount
and kind of censorship is required in their own societies for the protec-
tion of health or morals, since
[b]y reason of their direct and continuous contact with the vi-
tal forces of their countries, State authorities are in principle in
a better position than the international judge to give an opin-
ion on the exact content of these requirements as well as on the
'necessity' of a 'restriction' or 'penalty' intended to meet
them. 1
35
This point later was re-emphasized in response to the applicant's point-
ing out that similar versions of the book freely circulated in most of the
every school ought to have "at least one contraceptive vending machine." Id at 748, para. 34.For further discussion of the Handyside case, see Andrews, Current Survey.- Council of Europe.-
Censorshop Under the Obscene Pubhations Acts The Handyside Case, 2 EUR. L. REV. 156, 156-59
(1977).
132. 1 E.H.R.R. at 741-42, paras. 14-17.
133. In fact, the Court stated that "it is not possible to find in the domestic law of the
various Contracting States a uniform European conception of morals." Rather, views on the
subject vary "from time to time and from place to place, especially in our era which is
characterised by a rapid and far-reaching evolution of opinions on the subject." Id. at 753,
para. 48.
134. Article 10 provides as follows:
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall in-
clude freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas
without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This article
shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or
cinema enterprises.
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and respon-
sibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as
are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of
national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder
or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation
or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confi-
dence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.
Eur. Cony. on Human Rights, supra note 8, art. 10.
135. 1 E.H.R.R. at 753-54, para. 48 (quoted language refers to article 10(2), supra note
134).
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member states. The Court stated simply that the fact that a majority of
the contracting states had exercised their discretion to permit distribu-
tion of the work did not make the contrary decision of the English court
into a breach of article 10.136
On the other hand, the Court also recognised that freedom of ex-
pression is an essential foundation of a democratic society, and that any
restriction on it "must be proportionate to the legitimate aim pur-
sued."' 137 Under the circumstances of this case the actions taken by the
English authorities were held to be within their margin of appreciation
and thus not to constitute a breach of the Convention.
The more recent Sunday Times case' 38 also involved the right to free-
dom of expression, but in this instance the Court was not prepared to
give as wide a scope to the domestic margin of appreciation. The situa-
tion of which the Sunday Times complained arose while litigation was
pending in the United Kingdom against the English manufacturer of
the drug thalidomide, a sedative prescribed to pregnant women which
caused children to be born deformed. In response to the defendant's
complaint the Attorney-General obtained an injunction against the
Sunday Times to prevent it from publishing articles about the tragedy,
on the ground that such articles might prejudice the litigation and thus
amount to a contempt of court. 3 9 The proceedings were settled subse-
quently and the newspaper then was allowed to proceed with
publication. "
Whereas in Handyside the Court stressed that moral requirements
have varied and that state authorities are in a better position to deter-
mine the exact content of such requirements, in the Sunday Times case it
took the position that the principle of contempt of court, protecting as it
does the fairness and impartiality of trials, operates in an area in which
there is a more closely defined European norm. In the latter case, an
almost evenly divided Court essentially found that the idea of the au-
136. Id. at 759, para. 57.
137. Id. at 754-55, para. 49.
138. The Sunday Times v. U.K., 1979 Y.B. EUR. CONV. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 402 (Eur. Ct.
of Human Rights), ser. A., no. 30, 2 E.H.R.R. 245. For more extended discussion of this case
than is appropriate in the limited context of illustrating the concept of margin of apprecia-
tion, see Andrews, Current Survey." Council of Europe: The Sunday Times Case, 4 EUR. L. REV.
317, 317-21 (1979).
139. The original injunction was sought and granted against publication of a particular
article which discussed the issue of the defendant company's negligence. [1973] Q.B. 710.
The order was expanded as the result of a subsequent appeal to the House of Lords, and in its
amended form it barred publication by the Sunday Times of any article dealing with the
issues of negligence, breach of contract, or breach of duty on the part of the manufacturer.
1974 A.C. 273.
140. 2 E.H.R.R. at 249-54, paras. 8-16.
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thority and impartiality of the judiciary is a more objective notion than
is that of the protection of morals.141 This led the majority to adopt a
much more "interventionist" approach to article 10 than it had in
Handyside.
In reaching the decision that the restraint on publication in the
Sunday Times case violated article 10, a majority of the Court noted that
provisions like article 6 reflect "a fairly substantial measure of common
ground" in the law of signatory states as to what the "authority of the
judiciary" might entail, '42 but that there are no equivalent provisions
regarding morals.'43 "Accordingly," the Court concluded, "a more ex-
tensive European supervision corresponds to a less discretionary power
of appreciation."' 44
As a concluding note on the Sunday Times case and an introduction
to the next section, it ought to be remarked that within a matter of
months after the Court's decision the United Kingdom Parliament
passed an act reforming the law of contempt of court.' 45 The effect of
the reform was to bring the authority of English courts to grant civil
injunctions against newspapers more closely into line with the Conven-
tion as interpreted in the Sunday Times case.' 4 6
D. The Social and Cultural Dynamic of the Convention
The cases that best illustrate the dynamic element in the Conven-
tion are those in which the Court has responded to changing European
norms. There are a number of these and we will look at several of the
most significant.
In Repubh'c of Ireland v. United Kingdom'4 7 the Court held that five so-
called "techniques of interrogation" used in Ulster amounted to inhu-
man and degrading treatment. Those techniques consisted of: (a) wall
standing, in which the detainee was forced to stand for hours spread-
eagled against a wall with his feet back from the wall and apart, causing
him to rest his weight principally on his fingers and toes; (b) hooding, in
141. See id. at 275-76, para. 59. The Court held by a vote of 11 to 9 that, although the
restraint was "imposed by law" to achieve a "legitimate aim," it was not "necessary" to pro-
tect the authority of the judiciary, and thus violated article 10. Id. at 273, para. 53, 275, para.
57, 281-82, paras. 66-68.
142. 2 E.H.R.R. at 276, para. 59.
143. Id. See also supra note 133.
144. 2 E.H.R.R. at 276, para. 59.
145. Contempt of Court Act, 1981, ch. 49.
146. Under the Act, for example, publication is treated as contempt of court only when it
"creates a substantial risk that the course of justice in the proceedings in question will be
seriously impeded or prejudiced." Id. § 2-(2).
147. 1978 Y.B. EUR. CONy. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 602 (Eur. Ct. of Human Rights), ser. A,
no. 25, 2 E.H.R.R. 25.
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which a dark blanket was put over the detainee's head; (c) subjection to
noise, which involved putting the detainee in a room with a continuous
loud hissing noise; (d) depri'vati'on of sleep; and (e) deprivation of food and
drink, reducing the diet of detainees to a pint of water and a slice of
bread at six hourly intervals in some cases. 148 The Commission had
taken the view that the techniques amounted to torture within the
meaning of article 3 of the Convention. The majority of the Court,
however, was not prepared to hold that the techniques amounted to
torture, which it distinguished from inhuman or degrading treatment by
arguing that in using the former term the drafters of the Convention
had intended to attach "a special stigma" to behaviour characterised by
"deliberate inhuman treatment causing very serious and cruel suffer-
ing.""49 The distinction drawn by the majority of the Court was based
primarily upon the degree of intensity of the suffering inflicted, and in
its view the suffering caused in this case was not sufficient to warrant use
of the term "torture."
The Commission and the majority of the Court agreed that the
practices involved amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment.
The Commission thought that they did, and looked to the contemporary
practices of other European states in so finding. 5 ' The Court nearly
unanimously agreed. 5 ' The British Judge, Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, was
the sole dissenter from the judgment of the Court on this point. He
noted that the Convention was drafted with appreciation of the then
recent horrors of the Second World War, and argued that it was fair to
assume that when the Convention was signed the words "torture" and
"inhuman and degrading treatment" might reasonably have been con-
strued to refer to the sort of brutal excesses associated with the Second
World War and not to the sophisticated but less brutal techniques of
interrogation such as had been employed in Northern Ireland in the face
of a national emergency. 1 52 Judge Fitzmaurice took strong exception to
what he viewed as the Court's conscious aim of "developing" the Con-
vention in light of current practices, an undertaking which he regarded
as outside the Court's proper judicial function and not required by the
Convention. He argued rather that, especially in light of the absolute
character of the prohibition imposed by article 3, the term "torture" as
used within that article ought to be construed to reach only those prac-
148. See 2 E.H.R.R. at 59, para. 96, 130, para. 19.
149. Id. at 80, para. 167.
150. Republic of Ireland v. U.K., Eur. Comm'n on Human Rights, appl. no. 5310/71,
para. 402.
151. 2 E.H.R.R. at 80, para. 167. The vote on this point was 16 to 1.
152. 2 E.H.R.R. at 127, para. 17 (Fitzmaurice, J., dissenting).
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tices easily recognised as such, and not those "lesser forms of ill-treat-
ment" that, while worthy of censure, would not have been classified
instinctively as torture.153
In addition to the two opposing theories or philosophies of inter-
preting the Convention found in the majority opinion and in Judge
Fitzmaurice's dissent, Ireland v. United Kingdom also contains a political
lesson. Long before the case reached the Court the United Kingdom
Government had given directions that the five techniques should not be
used; indeed, the prevailing view within the United Kingdom was that
the Republic of Ireland had been unwise and unneighbourly in pressing
the case. The Irish Government was under political pressure, however,
and apparently felt that it could not be seen to fail in its duty to protect
the rights of Catholics in Ulster. Ultimately the Irish Government was
the loser, since the Commission in its own report had been of the opin-
ion that the practice amounted to torture. In effect the Court moved
away from that position but condemned the practices nonetheless.
A more significant case in terms of establishing European norms of
behavior under more normal circumstances was Trer v. United King-
dom.' 54 This case involved the infliction of a sentence of corporal pun-
ishment by a court in the Isle of Man, one of the few places in Western
Europe where a court still has authority to impose such a sentence. The
applicant was a fifteen-year-old who had been convicted, along with
three other boys, of unlawful assault on a senior pupil at his school. He
was sentenced to be birched and was given three strokes.
Both the Commission and the Court thought that there were no
significant social or cultural differences between the Isle of Man and the
United Kingdom, and that historically, geographically, and culturally
the island had always been considered a part of the European family of
nations. i15 In the Court's view it thus should be regarded as sharing the
"common [European] heritage of political traditions, ideals, freedom
and the rule of law" to which the Convention's preamble refers. 56 The
fact that corporal punishment had a lengthy history in the Isle of Man
and had popular support there as a method of dealing with violent teen-
age crimes was not deemed sufficient to justify a special Manx exception
to article 3 for a form of punishment that had come to be commonly
153. Id. at 127, paras. 16-17.
154. 1978 Y.B. EUR. CONy. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 612 (Eur. Ct. of Human Rights), ser. A,
no. 26, 2 E.H.R.R. 1.
155. 2 E.H.R.R. at 13, para. 38.
156. Id.
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regarded as degrading.' 57
The Tyrer opinion did not go so far as to state explicitly that all
forms of corporal punishment violate article 3 of the Convention. The
Court took notice of the way in which judicial birching is practised on
the Isle of Man, involving a delay between sentence and punishment
and the convicted person's being asked to remove his trousers and un-
derwear and being held down by police officers.' 58 In his dissenting
opinion, however, Judge Fitzmaurice pointed out that the majority had
carefully negated the idea that "[t]he indignity of having the punish-
ment administered over the bare posterior. . . was. . . the only or de-
termining factor" in its judgment.' 59 For his part, Judge Fitzmaurice
stressed the fact that the applicant was a juvenile when sentenced and
punished, and argued that indignities against the person in the course of
punishment traditionally have been considered more acceptable in the
case of juveniles than in that of adult offenders, and the absolute pro-
scription of article 3 ought to be construed in light of tradition.
As for the impact of this decision on domestic law, judicial birching
had not been practised elsewhere in the United Kingdom for years prior
to 7Tyrer. When in 1981 the United Kingdom renewed the right of its
citizens to make individual appeal to the Commission, it excluded appli-
cation of the right to the Isle of Man.' 6 ° It is nevertheless the case that
since the decision of the Court in Tyrer there has not been another birch-
ing on the island.
Complaints involving corporal punishment since Tyrer have arisen
largely from its use in schools. In Campbell & Cosans v. United Kingdom' 6'
the Court held that, where the parents of school children oppose the use
of corporal punishment, any infliction of such punishment in a state
school is a denial of the right of parents under article 2 of the first proto-
col to ensure that the education and teaching of their children conforms
to "their own religious and philosophical convictions."
Again we can see the dynamic of development within the Conven-
tion, since it is very unlikely that those who framed article 2 of the first
157. Id at 10, para. 31, and 13, para. 38.
The Court noted, in fact, that it is possible that many Manxmen who supported
corporal punishment did so precisely because they regarded it as degrading of aggressive teen-
age delinquents. 2 E.H.R.R. at 10, para. 31.
158. 2 E.H.R.R. at 11-12, paras. 33, 35.
159. Id. at 22, para. 9(v) (Fitzmaurice, J., dissenting) (quoting id at 12, para. 35).
160. 1981 Y.B. EUR. CONy. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 12 (United Kingdom Declaration under
art. 25 dated 19 August 1981); id. at 14 (Annexe dated 4 December 1981); f 1967 Y.B. EUR.
CONV. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 12, 12-16 (United Kingdom Declaration under art. 25 dated 12
September 1967).
161. Eur. Ct. of Human Rights, ser. A, no. 48, 4 E.H.R.R. 293 (1982).
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protocol had regard to the way in which discipline would be maintained
in schools. It is much more likely that they had in mind the content of
what was taught, and were seeking to ensure that this would not include
material offensive to the religious beliefs and philosophical principles of
parents. We have here an illustration of how a clause of the Convention
may be given a very wide interpretation with a substantial social and
cultural impact on a signatory state. The United Kingdom Govern-
ment pointed out to the Court some of the difficulties which would re-
sult from the Campbell & Cosans decision.162 It would be very difficult,
for instance, to impose corporal punishment on some children whose
parents were not philosophically opposed to it, whilst forbearing to use
the same punishment on others because of the conviction of their par-
ents. It would add substantially to the cost of education if children were
required to be educated in separate classes according to parental convic-
tion. Due in large part to such problems, the United Kingdom Govern-
ment has not yet reacted to the decision, though there are hints that
legislative reforms are being contemplated. Meanwhile, however, an in-
creasing number of British local education authorities restrict the use of
corporal punishment and in some cases ban it altogether, though tradi-
tionally it has been common in Scottish schools and still is used in some
English schools.
One ought not to infer from the cases cited above that the United
Kingdom is the only country to have violated the Convention. One of
the most important and wholly good decisions of the Court was in
Marckx v. Belgium,163 a case involving discrimination against an illegiti-
mate child.
Under the then existing Belgian law the birth of a child to an un-
married mother gave rise to no legal bond. Registration of the birth was
not in itself sufficient to establish maternal affiliation; that required a
formal act of voluntary recognition by the mother or the taking of legal
proceedings by the child within five years of attaining his or her major-
ity.1" Even after formal recognition, the illegitimate child had a lim-
ited relationship, since the legal bond existed solely between the mother
and child and did not exist vis-i-vis other members of the mother's fam-
ily. 65 The illegitimate child had no right of inheritance from the
mother's family, nor from the father or his family. s Even from the
162. See, e.g., id. at 305, para. 37.
163. 1979 Y.B. EUR. CONY. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 410 (Eur. Ct. of Human Rights), ser. A,
no. 31, 2 E.H.R.R. 330.
164. 2 E.H.R.R. at 335-36, para. 14.
165. Id. at 336-37, para. 16.
166. Id. at 337, para. 17.
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mother the rights of inheritance were limited. To provide him with
equal rights of succession the mother would have to adopt her illegiti-
mate child, and even that would not give him a right of intestacy vis-A-
vis estates of the mother's relatives.
16 7
In fairness to Belgium it must be noted these appalling laws were in
the process of being reformed at the time of the Court's judgment in the
Marckx case. 6 ' Within recent years many western European states have
adopted legislation to remove unpleasant discriminations against illegit-
imate children,'6 9 and in 1975 the member states of the Council of Eu-
rope agreed to a Convention on the Legal Status of Children Born out
of Wedlock. 7 ° At the time of the Marckx case, however, only ten states
had signed the Convention and a mere four had ratified it.
1 7 1
As we have seen, article 8(1) of the Convention provides that every-
one has the right to respect for his private and family life.' 72 The sub-
stantive rights guaranteed by the Convention also are protected by
article 14, which provides that "[t]he enjoyment of the rights and free-
doms set forth in this Convention shall be secured without discrimina-
tion on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political
or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national
minority, property, birth or other status." In a powerful dissenting
opinion in the Marckx case Judge Fitzmaurice argued that article 8 is
concerned primarily with what he called the "domiciliary protection" of
the individual. He argued that it is intended to protect against arbi-
trary police raids, intrusions, and questioning, against the planting of
bugging devices, interference with domestic services, and like matters."'
But the Court, to its credit, decided that the relationship between an
illegitimate child and its natural relatives clearly is encompassed by the
concept of family life as contained in article 8. 14 Once this step was
taken it followed that there had been a violation of article 14, since the
Belgian laws in question obviously discriminated against the illegitimate
child's enjoyment of family life on the ground of status at birth.
167. Id. at 338, para. 19.
168. Id., para. 20.
169. See Krause, Creation of Relationships of Kinship, in 4 INT'L ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMP. L.
ch. 6, 10-12 (A. Chloros ed. 1976).
170. European Treaty Series, No. 85.
171. Eekelaar, Reforming the English Law Concerning Illegitimate Persons, 14 FAM. L.Q. 41
(1980).
172. See supra note 10.
173. 2 E.H.R.R. at 366, para. 7 (Fitzmaurice, J., dissenting). His opinion ought to be read
in the light of previous occasions on which he argued that the Convention should be inter-
preted in light of the climate in 1950, at which time most states in western Europe discrimi-
nated against the illegitimate child. See, e.g., supra notes 123, 152-53 and accompanying text.
174. 2 E.H.R.R. at 344-45, paras. 36-37.
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The Court's decision in the Marckx case was a good one which pro-
vided the final encouragement to Belgium to rid itself of pernicious rules
regarding illegitimate children. It also presented the clearest illustration
to date of the extent to which rights under the Convention come to be
rewritten as European social attitudes change, and it demonstrated the
significant impact that development of the Convention may have upon
the laws of member states.
Another case confirming this is Dudgeon v. Uni'ted Kingdom. t75 The
Dudgeon Court ruled that a total prohibition on acts of sodomy and of
gross indecency between adult males under the law of Northern Ireland
was a breach of article 8 of the Convention, as it failed to recognise the
right to respect for private life.176 Here again the Court found a partic-
ular application that could not have been in the contemplation of those
responsible for drafting the article in 1950, since prohibitions on homo-
sexual conduct of any kind were widespread in Europe at that time.
177
Once it had accepted the argument that homosexual relationships
could be a matter of private life, the only issue for the Dudgeon Court was
whether proscription of those relationships is necessary in a democratic
society in the interest of public order or morals. 17 8 The Court was di-
vided on the question of the proper application of the doctrine of mar-
gin of appreciation in this case. Two judges, Judge Zekia of Cyprus and
Judge Walsh of Ireland, sought to emphasise the extent to which Chris-
tian and Moslem values still united in condemning homosexuality and
other unnatural sexual relationships. 179 A majority of the Court clearly
was convinced that the European norm had moved on, however, and
was not prepared to apply the same wide margin of appreciation it had
afforded to the United Kingdom in the earlier Handyside case.18 ° In the
Court's words:
[N]ot only the nature of the aim of the restriction but also the
175. 1981 Y.B. EUR. CONV. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 444 (Eur. Ct. of Human Rights), ser. A,
no. 45, 4 E.H.R.R. 149.
176. 4 E.H.R.R. at 161-62, para. 41.
177. Since 1967, homosexual acts between consenting male adults over the age of 21 con-
ducted in private have been outside the compass of the criminal law in England and Wales.
A similar rule was introduced in Scotland in 1980, but at the time of the Dudgeon case there
was a total proscription on homosexual acts in Ulster. Attempts to liberalise the law had been
prevented by the forces parading under the banner of the Reverend Ian Paisley's crusade to
"Save Ulster from Sodomy."
178. Of course it could be argued that since homosexual relationships by definition involve
more than one person they are not a matter of private life, but this issue was not pursued and
it is unlikely that the argument would have gained many adherents on the Court.
179. 4 E.H.R.R. at 171, para. 1, (Zekia, J., dissenting); id at 185, para. 16, (Walsh, J.,
dissenting).
180. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
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nature of the activity involved will affect the scope of the mar-
gin of appreciation. The present case concerns the most inti-
mate aspect of private life. Accordingly, there must exist
particularly serious reasons before interference on the part of
the public authority can be legitimate for the purposes of para-
graph 2 of Article 8.1"'
In other words, the Court limited the margin of appreciation by perti-
nent application of the principle that a much wider power justifiably
may be allowed for legislation with respect to public aspects of morality
than for restrictions on the private conduct of individuals.
This is not to say that no degree of discretion is left to signatory
states in controlling homosexual conduct. The Court has recognised
that states have a responsibility to protect the young and the impression-
able, 8 2 and neither the Court nor the Commission have held that prohi-
bition of homosexual relationships between an adult person and
someone under the age of twenty-one violates the Convention. The age
limit for proscribing homosexual conduct varies in western European
countries between sixteen and twenty-one, and the United Kingdom
Government has since legislated to bring the law of Northern Ireland
into line with that of England and Wales, which incorporates a twenty-
one-year limit.
So far most countries have responded as has the United Kingdom
and have amended their laws or their executive practices to take ac-
count of the decisions of the Court. The countries least likely to be able
or willing to bring their laws into line with jurisprudence under the
Convention are precisely the ones that have not recognised the right of
individual petition. 8 3 Some states also have made specific reservations
regarding certain provisions in the Convention. 8 4 So for example
Liechtenstein, the most recent state to ratify the Convention, deposited
several reservations with its ratification. Its reservation in connection
with the obligation of respect for private life under article 8 qualifies
that obligation with respect to homosexuality and the status of illegiti-
mate children, women, and aliens, so as to accord with existing princi-
ples of Liechtenstein law."8 5
Eventually, however, there may come a time when a contracting
181. 4 E.H.R.R. at 165, para. 52.
182. Id. at 168, para. 62; see also Reports of the Commission in X v. Ger., Eur. Comm'n on
Human Rights, appl. no. 5935/72; X v. U.K., Eur. Comm'n on Human Rights, appl. no.
7215/75; Andrews, Current Survey: Council of Europe.- Homosexual Rights in the United Kingdom, 5
EUR. L. REV. 513, 515-17 (1980).
183. Turkey, Greece, Malta, and Cyprus do not recognise this right. See supra note 26.
184. See supra note 13.
185. See Andrews, Current Survey. Council of Europe, 8 EUR. L. REV. 144 (1983).
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party will feel unable to bring its laws into conformity with evolving
norms under the Convention. It is possible that, if such a major test
occurs, it will be in the Republic of Ireland. In Airey v. Irelanan8 6 the
Court held that the Irish Government violated articles 6 and 8 of the
Convention by denying legal aid to Mrs. Airey in her attempt to obtain
a judicial separation from her husband. In the Court's view the govern-
ment's refusal to provide legal aid in the civil matter operated effectively
to deny Mrs. Airey the remedy of judicial separation, since she was un-
able to afford the cost of representation and the legal procedure was too
complicated for an individual litigant to follow without assistance.'
8 7
The Court therefore held that denial of legal aid amounted to a denial
of the applicant's right of access to a court for the determination of her
civil rights under article 6(1) as construed in Golder.' The Court also
qualified the right involved, however, by stating that legal aid may not
have to be provided where procedures are simple enough for a litigant
to be able to appear effectively on his or her own behalf.'89
It should be remembered that legal aid was something of a rarity in
Europe in 1950 when article 6 was drafted; certainly it was far from
being available as of right whenever needed, and indeed that probably
still is the case today. Once again, then, we see illustrated the dynamic
of the Convention's development. There is, moreover, another aspect of
the Airey decision that holds even greater potential significance for the
future of the jurisprudence of the Convention and its interaction with
domestic laws: By a bare majority of four to three the Airy Court also
held that the Irish Government's failure to provide legal aid breached its
obligation under article 8 to respect Mrs. Airey's private and family
life. 1" The majority reasoned that this article not only compels the
state to abstain from actively interfering with family life, but also may
impose "positive obligations inherent in an effective respect for private
186. 1979 Y.B. EUR. CONY. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 420 (Eur. Ct. of Human Rights), ser. A,
no. 32, 2 E.H.R.R. 305.
187. 2 E.H.R.R. at 314-15, para. 24, 317-18, para. 27.
188. Id. at 314, para. 22, 318, para. 28. The Irish judge dissented on the ground that
absence of legal aid was not in itself a "bar or impediment on Mrs. Airey's seeking access to
the High Court" to obtain a judicial separation. Id. at 322, para. 3 (O'Donoghue, J., dissent-
ing). Another judge dissented on similar grounds, arguing for a narrower construction of
article 6(1) than that adopted by the majority. Id. at 326-27, paras. 2-5 (Vilhjalmsson, J.,
dissenting).
189. Id. at 316-17, para 26.
190. Id. at 319, para. 33. Again, Judge O'Donoghue was among the dissenting members of
the Court, and Judge Vilhjalmsson's dissenting opinion went so far as to characterise the
majority's interpretation of article 8 as "far-fetched." Id. at 327, para. 6 (Vilhjalmsson, J.,
dissenting).
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or family life." '' Among those obligations is that of making relief from
the legal duty of cohabitation "effectively accessible" when a marriage is
breaking up and either partner wishes to be relieved of the duty to co-
habit with the other.1
92
It is difficult to see how the logic of the "private and family life"
argument can be stopped at the point of requiring that states afford
access to the existing remedy of judicial separation, and not be taken
further to require that they afford the remedy itself or even the remedy
of divorce. Those remedies provide different degrees of the same kind of
relief: whereas the former relieves parties from a duty to cohabit, the
latter restores total independence from the unwanted spouse and per-
mits entry into a fresh marriage and a new family life if desired.' 93 This
argument is even stronger if one party to the first marriage already is
living with another by whom he or she has had children. If the Court is
prepared to recognise a right to obtain severance of the obligation to
cohabit with the first spouse, then it is prepared to give that right of
severance precedence over marital obligations. It would seem then to be
a relatively short step to extending the protection of article 8 to the fam-
ily life associated with a subsequent extra-marital relationship.
The fact that the Irish proscription on divorce arises out of Catholic
doctrine and is enshrined in the country's constitution' 94 may not be
sufficient to save it. The tenor of the Court's decisions in cases like
Marckx has been to give a positive effect to the Convention in the face of
rules that clearly are unjust and discriminatory,'9 5 and decisions like
Dudgeon indicate that the Court is not inclined to recognise the legiti-
macy of proscriptions arising out of long-term cultural prejudices or
confirmed patterns of behaviour.196 The Irish proscription on divorce
effectively thwarts those who wish to have the benefit of an opportunity
which would be available to them in most other states in western Eu-
rope, and whether it would be viewed as prejudicial or otherwise unwor-
191. Id. at 319, para. 32.
192. Id., para. 33.
193. The majority's opinion notes that "protection of private or family life may sometimes
necessitate [spouses'] being relieved from the duty to live together." Id This language at least
suggests that if Ireland had not had an existing remedy of judicial separation it might have
been required to create that remedy under article 8. Would such reasoning extend to the
more drastic remedy of divorce? Judge O'Donoghue may have feared that it would, since he
noted that "I am not aware that it has ever been contended that divorce legislation is either
required or prohibited by any article of the Convention." Id at 323, para. 9 (O'Donoghue, J.,
dissenting).
194. Article 41.3.20 of the Irish Constitution provides that "[nlo law shall be enacted pro-
viding for the grant of a dissolution of marriage."
195. See supra notes 163-74 and accompanying text.
196. See supra notes 175-81 and accompanying text.
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thy of precedence over competing individual rights is an open
question.1 97
Ultimately there must be some limitation on the extent to which
the interpretation and development of rights under the Convention can
be allowed to intrude into the established social doctrines and conven-
tions of member states. The Azle case has not disturbed a hornet's nest,
confining itself as it does to consideration of the applicability of an ex-
isting remedy under Irish law, but it contains in its arguments some
themes which will require careful consideration by the Court in future
cases. These could lead to direct confrontation between the right to pri-
vacy, independence, and freedom of the individual on the one hand and
the conventions and moral dictates of the state on the other.
Another and potentially more explosive case was defused by the
refusal of the Court to rule on its merits. The applicant in Van Oos-
terwick v. Belgium1 98 was born in 1944 with female physical characteris-
tics and was registered as a female. Psychologically he always saw
himself as a male person, however, and between 1969 and 1973 he un-
derwent hormone therapy and a series of operations the effect of which
was to change his sexual characteristics substantially to those of a male
person.' 99 He then sought to have his entry in the Belgium civil status
register amended so as to record his new sex. A Belgian court dismissed
his case on the ground that the original entry was correct, 20 0 and he
failed to take his case to the final court in Belgium, the Cour de Cassa-
tion. The European Court of Human Rights ruled by a thirteen-to-four
majority that his case should be dismissed on the ground of failure to
exhaust domestic remedies. 20 1
197. It could be argued that the Irish ban on divorce is necessary for the protection of
morals or the rights and freedoms of others in the democratic society of the Republic of
Ireland, and thus that the ban is permissible under article 8(2). (Divorce is unlikely to under-
mine the Irish national security, public safety, or economic well being, and thus the other
grounds on which interference with private and family lives may be justified appear to be
inapplicable.) As already noted, however, the Court tends to look to the contemporary prac-
tices of other signatory states when determining what margin of appreciation to allow any
single state under the Convention. See supra text accompanying notes 130-36. The trend
among signatory states is away from the strict position maintained by Ireland in matters of
marital dissolution, and that position therefore may be vulnerable.
198. 1980 Y.B. EUR. CONY. ON HUMAN RIGHTS (Eur. Ct. of Human Rights), ser. A, no.
40, 3 E.H.R.R. 557.
199. 3 E.H.R.R. at 560-61, para. 9-11.
200. Id. at 561, para. 12.
201. Id. at 572, para. 41. The Commission, however, had been of the opinion that the
applicant's rights under articles 8 and 12 of the Convention had been violated. See Van Oos-
terwijck v. Beig., 1978 Y.B. EUR. CONV. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 476 (Eur. Comm'n on Human
Rights), appl. no. 7654/76; Andrews, Current Survey. Council of Europe. Human Rights Cases, 6
EUR. L. REv. 67, 67-69 (1981). Article 12 provides: "Men and women of marriageable age
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This case raised fascinating issues which were not explored by the
Commission in its opinion and which the Court avoided by failing to
reach the merits. Not the least difficult of these would arise when some-
one already married, perhaps with natural or adopted children, under-
went a similar operation. If such a person were able to register a change
of sex, what effect would it have on his or her marriage? Could the
marriage be considered to have continuing validity if both parties to it
were registered as males or females? Arguably the state would be justi-
fied in refusing to register a change of sex in such cases "for the protec-
tion of the rights and freedoms of others," i.e., the spouse or children of
the marriage. Indeed, the state might be justified in forbidding such
operations altogether in circumstances where they could be destructive
of family life. These problems illustrate the conflicts that can arise when
liberal tolerance of minorities and deviants clashes with social realities.
Clearly there is no easy solution, but the course taken by the Van Oos-
terwyck Court, which was to avoid expressing a view on the merits of the
case, can amount only to postponing the difficulty of grappling with
these issues.
E. Jurisprudence of the Commission of Human Rights
Opinions of the Commission obviously carry less weight than judg-
ments of the Court. They are not the product of adjudication and are
not binding on the parties to a dispute, as are decisions of the Commit-
20220tee and judgments of the Court.20 3 To note this is not to denigrate
the Commission's opinions and reports, however, since they form a prin-
cipal part of the dossier forwarded to the Court in many of the most
important cases, and the views of the Commission are argued to the
Court just as are those of the High Contracting Party or Parties in-
volved.2 °4 Moreover, there have been some important opinions of the
Commission in cases which have not proceeded to the Court, opinions to
have the right to marry and to found a family, according to the national laws governing the
exercise of this right." Eur. Cony. on Human Rights, supra note 8, art. 12.
The Commission was unanimous that the state's refusal to change the applicant's
registration violated his right to respect for private life under article 8, whilst on the issue of
his right to marry it split seven to four. The latter position is rather puzzling, since under
existing Belgian law the applicant was registered as female and clearly could not marry an-
other woman, but by reason of his psychological and physical condition it had now become
inconceivable that he could marry a man. Of course there was no question of depriving him
of his right to found a family, outside the possibility of adoption within marriage; remarkable
though his medical treatment was, it had its limits.
202. Eur. Cony. on Human Rights, supra note 8, art. 32(4).
203. Id. art. 53.
204. See, e.g., Rules of the Eur. Ct. of Human Rights, 1958-59 Y.B. EUR. CONV. ON
HUMAN RIGHTS 2, rules 29, 38(1), 42(2).
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which member states have responded by changing their laws and prac-
tices. We shall focus on a few such decisions dealing with two sorts of
rights or freedoms under the Convention: the right to marry and the
right to life.
I. Marnage Rights.-The opinions of the Commission in two cases,
Hamer v. United Kngdom2°5 and Draper v. United Kingdom, 06 are of particu-
lar interest. The Commission found in both cases that the United King-
dom Government violated the Convention by denying prisoners the
right to marry whilst serving their sentences.
Draper had been sentenced in 1974 to life imprisonment on a
charge of murder in the course of robbery, with a recommendation that
he serve a minimum of twenty-five years in prison. The Commission
rejected the argument that interference with Draper's right to marry
was justified because, even if he had been allowed to marry when he first
made application in 1977, his new relationship could not have had sub-
stance until his release in 1999.17 Rather, the Commission unani-
mously took the view that the right protected by article 12 is a right to
form a legally binding association between a man and a woman, a right
which could not be denied the applicant: "It is for [the parties them-
selves] to decide whether or not they wish to enter into [a marriage] in
circumstances where they cannot cohabit."2 °8 The Commission also
noted that no issues of public interest stood in the way of such a union in
the circumstances of Hamer or Draper.2°9
The United Kingdom Government challenged the Commission in
Draper to say whether the right to marry should extend to prisoners con-
victed of sexual and serious domestic offences, prisoners whose marriage
or remarriage might outrage public opinion.2 " As might be expected
the Commission ducked this issue, noting that its function is not to
205. Eur. Comm'n on Human Rights, appl. no. 7114/75, 24 Decisions & Reports 5, 4
E.H.R.R. 139 (1979).
206. Eur. Comm'n on Human Rights, appl. no. 8186/78, 24 Decisions & Reports 72
(1980).
207. 24 Decisions & Reports at 81, paras. 59-60.
208. Id. at 81, para. 60.
209. Id. at 16, para. 72, 81, para. 61. The facts of H'amer are similar to those of Draper, and
in fact the Commission heard the cases at the same time. Whereas Mr. Draper had received a
life sentence, Mr. Hamer had been sentenced to five years. Id. at 8, para. 13. He would not
have been eligible for parole for some 15 months after the date of his original request for
permission to leave the prison to be married. The applicant was released more than two years
later, having been denied the earliest possible parole, and in the meantime his erstwhile in-
tended had married someone else. Id at 16, para. 70. In Mr. Hamer's case, therefore, the
interference with his right to marry resulted from the state's imposition of a substantial delay
on its exercise, but the delay was of a much shorter and more definite duration than in the
case of Mr. Draper.
210. Id. at 81-82, para. 62.
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express an opinion in abstracto. It did suggest in dicta, however, that
restriction on the right to marry might be justified in certain cases on
the basis of public interest.
2 1
'
Until the United Kingdom Government responded to the opinions
in these cases by amending its prison rules, it was rare indeed for British
prisoners to be allowed to marry except where this was necessary to en-
sure the legitimacy of a child. 2  Readers may draw their own conclu-
sions as to whether availability of marriage to prisoners is desirable.
Many argue that marriage provides the prisoner with a measure of se-
curity and emotional stability during his sentence and on his release,
whilst others say that such marriages are essentially unstable and, inso-
far as the prisoner is responsible for his circumstances, he has no right to
complain. There is some truth and a large amount of over-generalisa-
tion in both views. It is sufficient to note here that in reaching its deci-
sions the Commission found "relevant . . . the general tendency in
European penal systems in recent years towards reduction of the differ-
ences between prison life and life at liberty and the increasing emphasis
laid on rehabilitation. 
' 213
2. Right to Life.-Unlike the United States Supreme Court,2 14 the
European Court of Human Rights has not been squarely faced with
issues involving the right to life. The Commission has dealt with such
cases, however, and there is little doubt that the Court itself will be
faced with them over the next few years.
In Bruggemann & Scheuten v. Federal Republic of Germany'5 the appli-
cants complained that German law limiting the availability of abortion
violated their right to respect for their private and family lives, 21 6 argu-
ing with obvious logic that sexual relations and family planning came
within the sphere of private and family life and that criminal sanctions
constituted interference.
The case could have raised issues as central as those that have taxed
the United States Supreme Court ever since its decision in Roe v.
211. Id.
212. See, e.g., id. at 77, para. 25.
213. Id. at 78, para. 44.
214. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
215. Eur. Comm'n on Human Rights, appl. no. 6959/75, 10 Decisions & Reports 100, 3
E.H.R.R. 244 (1977).
216. The laws in question permitted abortion only when the mother's life or health was at
risk, when there was a risk of the child being born incurably ill, when the pregnancy was the
result of a criminal offence against the mother, or when it was otherwise advisable in order to
avert the danger of severe distress to the mother threatened by a continued pregnancy. Id. at
249-50 (quoting the Fifteenth Criminal Law Amendment Act (Fuinfzehntes Strafrechtsand
rungsqusetz)).
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Wade.217 For example, the right to private and family life under article
8 can be restricted as far as is necessary in a democratic society for the
protection of the rights and freedoms of others. Is the foetus "another"
within the meaning of that phrase? Similarly, article 2 of the Conven-
tion provides that "[e]veryone's right to life shall be protected by law."
Is the unborn child a person and its physical viability a life within the
contemplation of article 2? The Commission seemed to move tenta-
tively toward accepting the idea that the unborn child is of some juridi-
cal significance. It noted that the unborn child often has rights of
inheritance,2 18 although it failed to note that these remain inchoate un-
til birth, a factor which must be significant. It similarly noted that the
United Nations Covenant on Civil and Political Rights prohibits the
execution of death sentences on pregnant women, 2 9 although that argu-
ment is largely a humanitarian one and does not directly concern the
status of the foetus.
Ultimately, however, the Commission took the view that the issue
of pregnancy and its termination is not solely a matter within the pri-
vate life of the mother. It noted that every contracting state imposes
some restrictions on the right to abortion.2 20 These vary from Sweden,
which has an unqualified right of abortion during the first eighteen
weeks of pregnancy, to countries like Ireland, Malta, and Greece, where
abortions rarely are allowed.221 In this respect German law was not seri-
ously out of line with that of other member states, and thus the Commis-
sion deemed German law to be within the limits of discretion
222isrulcontemplated by the framers of the Convention. Perhaps this result
reflects a general Western European law which, "for the protection of
health or morals," allows states to limit the private right of a pregnant
woman to an abortion. In any event the right to life of the foetus was
not at issue in this case.
More recently in Xv. Unz'tedA'ngdom221 the Commission heard from
217. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). The parallel between the function of the Supreme Court and
the European Court of Human Rights in defining the boundaries of human rights and indi-
vidual freedoms is striking, but the European Court and Commission have been provided
with an express right to privacy in Article 8 of the Convention. They did not have the prob-
lem of "teasing" a right of privacy out of a constitutional instrument, and thus there is no
European case corresponding to Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
218. 10 Decisions & Reports at 116, para. 60.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 116-17, para. 61.
221. See Report of the Commision in Bruiggemann and Scheuten v. Ger., Eur. Comm'n on
Human Rights, appl. no. 6959/75, app. V (1977).
222. 10 Decisions & Reports at 117, para. 64.
223. Eur. Comm'n on Human Rights, appl. no. 8416/79, 19 Decisions & Reports 244
(1980).
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an applicant who complained of being unable to prevent his wife from
obtaining an abortion. Without success he had sought to obtain from
an English court an injunction against her and the manager of a nursing
home at which it was proposed to carry out the abortion. His case was a
weak one, since his argument that the abortion breached his own right
to "private and family life" clearly was at odds with his wife's right to
respect for her private life in which she sought to have the pregnancy
terminated. The Commission opined that the rejection of the husband's
petition for an injunction was justified under article 8(2) because it was
necessary for the protection of the rights of the mother, and rejected the
complaint based on that article as "manifestly ill-founded. ' 22 4 In an
important passage the Commission stated that, in view of the rights of
the pregnant wife,
the husband's and potential father's right to respect for his pri-
vate and family life can[not] be interpreted so widely as to em-
brace such procedural rights as claimed by the applicant, i.e. a
right to be consulted, or a right to make applications, about an
abortion which his wife intends to have performed on her.225
On this and other grounds the application was declared to be
inadmissible.
The father also argued the rights of the unborn child in accordance
with the text of article 2(1) of the Convention, which provides that
"[e]veryone's right to life shall be protected by law." The terms "every-
one" and "no one" appear in all but one of the articles of the Conven-
tion which set out the basic rights and freedoms to be protected. The
Commission noted that the term "everyone" is not defined in the Con-
vention, but that in no instance in which the word "everyone" is used is
there possible prenatal application-although such an interpretation
could not be excluded entirely. 226 Similarly, the qualifications in article
2(2) which permit the taking of life in the case of lawful execution, self-
defence, arrest, and so on, clearly have application only to living per-
sons.2 27 The Commission concluded that the overall tenor of the Con-
vention suggests that the word "everyone" does not include reference to
224. 19 Decisions & Reports at 253, para. 26.
225. Id. at 254, para. 27.
This must be right. It would be totally at odds with the dignity of a woman to argue
that the man who has made her pregnant should have any additional right to determine her
condition. That is not to deny the interests which society may have in the morality or social
aspects of abortion; these are, of course, concerns which must be balanced against the individ-
ual freedom of the mother. But to seek to balance the liberty of the mother against the
predilections of the father is not something which the law should seek to do.
226. Id. at 249, para. 7.
227. Id. at 250, para. 8.
[VOL. 43:463
EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS
the unborn.2 28
The Commission also briefly considered the meaning of the term
"life" in article 2, but it cannot be said that its discussion added any-
thing significant to the general debate.2 29 Clearly the foetus could not
be recognised as having an absolute right to life if that meant that its
right to life should continue in the face of serious risk of death or injury
to the pregnant woman. Whether the foetus should be regarded as hav-
ing a qualified right to life was something on which the Commission
avoided expressing a final opinion.
IV. THE INDUSTRIAL AND POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE
CONVENTION
The European Convention on Human Rights is largely concerned
with the traditional political and civil liberties, although as we have seen
this has provided the opportunity for the Court to pronounce a series of
decisions which have a substantial social and cultural impact. The Con-
vention does not seek to protect economic and social rights, but this does
not prevent it having substantial social significance. Traditionally it is
an instrument warmly supported by liberals and radicals, but it can
serve as a stumbling block to those who seek to press for too great a
measure of social reform. The most significant decision in this respect to
date was taken by the Court in the "Closed-shop case." In spite of the
fact that the decision itself was inconclusive and evasive, it has had an
impact on United Kingdom industrial practices.
In Young, James & Webster v. United Kingdom (the "Closed-shop
case") 30 the applicants were employees of British Rail before the con-
clusion of a closed-shop agreement 23 ' between British Rail and its three
railway unions in 1975. Each refused to join one of the appropriate
unions.2 3 2 The case revolved around the interpretation of article 11
which provides:
228. Id., para. 9.
229. The Commission's opinion rejected any interpretation of article 2 that would recog-
nize an absolute right to life in the foetus, but refrained from taking a position on wherther
that article does not cover the foetus at all or whether it has application "with certain implied
limitations." Id. at 252-53, paras. 17-23.
230. 1981 Y.B. EUR. CONV. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 440 (Eur. Ct. of Human Rights), ser. A,
no. 44, 4 E.H.R.R. 38.
231. The closed-shop can take on different forms, but in essence it is a system which re-
quires an employee to join an appropriate trade union.
232. Two of the employees refused to join on grounds which could loosely be described as
conscience and political persuasion, while the other appears to have refused to join because
the union was not looking after his interests to his satisfaction. 4 E.H.R.R. at 47, para. 34, 48-
49, para. 37, 49-50, paras. 43-44.
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Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to
freedom of association with others, including the right to form
and join trade unions for the protection of his interests.
The question for the Court was whether the right to freedom of
association with others implies the right to choose freely not to associate
with others. The evidence of the travaux preparatoires suggests that the
Convention was not intended to strike at the closed-shop, but the major-
ity of the members of the Court took the view that if there was no con-
trol over the methods of compulsion which could be imposed on workers
to join a trade union then this would strike at the very substance of the
freedom which article 11 was designed to guarantee. The Court drew
back from expressing a view on the legality of the closed-shop system
itself, but had specific regard of the circumstances in which the three
employees were dismissed from their livelihood for failing to join the
union.233 It is by no means certain that the same principle would have
been applied by the Court if the closed-shop had already been in exist-
ence when the employees had joined British Rail.
The "Closed-shop case" leaves more questions unanswered than it
answers, but it is included here to demonstrate that the jurisprudence
which is developing under the European Convention on Human Rights
is not confined to developing and enlarging new social and cultural
norms and to the traditional areas of liberty and due process of law. It
can have wider economic and industrial significance. Under a Tory
Government the United Kingdom trade unions have lost much of their
power and privilege, and the potential clash between the policies of a
government elected on a platform of increasing the power of organised
labour and the United Kingdom's international treaty obligations has
been avoided for the time being.
V. CONCLUSION
We have attempted to present and analyze the evolving jurispru-
dence under the European Convention on Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms by focusing on certain dynamic tensions, tensions that
have shaped that jurisprudence to date and undoubtedly will influence
its future development. The inherent conflict between a need for uni-
form enforcement of the Convention, on the one hand, and the special
problems and situations of signatory states on the other has been eased
in part by the application of the doctrine of the margin of appreciation.
This is a fluid concept which can accommodate some of the inevitable
ebb and flow of changing norms and changing circumstances as well as
233. 4 E.H.R.R. at 53-54, paras. 53-54.
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the differences in domestic practices and mores. Like the application of
the doctrine of the margin of appreciation, the substance of various
rights and corresponding obligations embodied in the Convention and
its protocols also has evolved-at first slowly but then much more rap-
idly since the first decision of the European Court of Human Rights
nearly a quarter of a century ago.
We also have looked at some of the ramifications of being a signa-
tory state, focusing particularly on the United Kingdom. The slow etch-
ing out of rights from an instrument phrased in the broad language of
principle is a process unfamiliar to the British, and in the case of the
Convention some of the results of that process have been disconcerting
to them. It has been a salutary experience for the United Kingdom,
which has long prided itself on its tradition of established political and
civil rights, to be found wanting at the bar of European opinion. Brit-
ain's Magna Carta traditionally has been viewed as something of a bea-
con of civil rights in the Middle Ages, and her philosophers and
constitutional protections greatly influenced the American Declaration
of Independence and the later Bill of Rights in the United States Consti-
tution. It is ironic that United Kingdom citizens should have had to
wait so long and finally settle for an international instrument to provide
them with the fundamental protections they taught others to cherish.
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